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Polluting Medical Judgment?  False Assumptions 
in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label 
Prescribing* 
Sandra H. Johnson** 
INTRODUCTION 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug 
signals certification of the drug’s safety and efficacy for 
specified purposes, at the dosing level, and for the duration of 
use examined during the agency’s approval process.  Some 
estimates, however, indicate that over half of the prescription 
medications provided to patients in the United States may be 
prescribed for a purpose, in a higher or lower dose, over a 
longer period of time, or for a population (such as children) 
different from that for which the drug has been approved.1  
 ©  2008 Sandra H. Johnson. 
 * This article is based on the Inaugural Fallon-Friedlander Lecture in 
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School in May 2006.  The author is grateful for the helpful comments of 
Richard Epstein, Mark Siegler, and David Meltzer on the lecture, as well as 
Kristin Madison (University of Pennsylvania) and my colleagues Jesse 
Goldner and Tim Greaney on drafts of this article.  The author also gratefully 
acknowledges the research assistance of Steven Squires and Melanie Rankin. 
 ** Tenet Endowed Chair in Health Law and Ethics, Center for Health 
Law Studies, Saint Louis University School of Law and Saint Louis University 
Department of Health Care Ethics; Professor of Law in Internal Medicine, 
Saint Louis University School of Medicine; and Professor of Health Care 
Administration, Saint Louis University School of Public Health. 
 1. David Radley et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based 
Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1025 (2006) (estimating that 
approximately 21% of prescriptions overall in the medical office setting were 
off-label solely in terms of the indication or purpose for which the medication 
was prescribed, although some categories of medications—specifically, cardiac 
medications and antihismatics for allergies—had much higher rates, 
approaching or exceeding 50%).  Off-label prescribing of medications for 
psychiatric conditions appears to be higher than that for other medical 
conditions.  Id.; see Hua Chen et al., Off-Label Use of Antidepressant, 
Anticonfulxant, and Antipsychotic Medications Among Georgia Medicaid 
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This common practice, called “off-label” prescribing, has raised 
significant concerns over the safety and efficacy of medications 
prescribed outside the scope of their FDA approval.2  A study 
published in the Archives of Internal Medicine in May, 2006, 
sharpened these questions when it reported that “most” off-
label prescriptions studied had “little or no scientific support.”3  
Concerns over the effectiveness or even the safety of such off-
label prescribing are significant for individual patients, for 
private and public health care budgets, and for the public 
health.  The advent of the Medicare prescription drug benefit4 
has intensified the interest in the phenomenon of off-label 
prescribing and in the relationships between the 
pharmaceutical industry and practicing physicians.5   
Enrollees in 2001, 67 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 972, 975 (2006) (“75% of 
antidepressant recipients and 80% of anticonvulsant recipients received at 
least one of these medications off label.”); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Off-Label 
Prescribing, http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/articles/bioethics/ (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2006) (“[E]stimates [of off-label prescribing] run as high as 60% 
of all drug prescriptions in the United States in a given year.”); David M. 
Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, Harm the Patient?  Why the FDA Needs 
to Seek More, Rather Than Less, Speech From Drug Manufacturers on Off-
Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 315, 356 n.219 (2005) 
(“One estimate indicated off-label use accounted for 40–50% of the $216 billion 
spent on U.S. prescription drugs in 2003.”); cf. Megan Barnett, The New Pill 
Pushers: Big Pharma Watches Lawsuit Over ‘Off-Label’ Prescription Drug 
Marketing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 26, 2004, at 40 (“An estimated 23 
percent of prescriptions are written for off-label uses.”). 
 2. Radley, supra note 1, at 1021. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (expanding Medicare to cover 
prescription drugs for beneficiaries). 
 5. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million 
to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label 
Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/ 
04_civ_322.htm (quoting the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services that fraud litigation directed at off-label marketing and 
prescribing “sends a strong message in advance of the implementation of the 
Medicare prescription drug benefit that our first priority will be protecting 
beneficiaries and the programs that serve them”); Nicole Huberfeld, Pharma 
on the Hot Seat, 40 J. HEALTH L. 241, 253 (2007) (“Direct reimbursement by 
Medicare [through Part D] means that the DOJ will have many more 
opportunities to regulate the industry through enforcement of the federal 
False Claims Act.”); see also Gardiner Harris, U.S. Weighs Not Paying for All 
Uses of Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at C1 (“Federal Medicare 
officials are close to deciding whether to refuse for the first time to pay for 
unapproved uses of expensive cancer drugs.”). 
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Actions taken to constrain off-label prescribing in response 
to these increasing concerns, however, face a serious risk of 
error. Counterintuitively, efforts to categorically restrict off-
label prescribing will harm individual patients, who will be 
denied medication that may be uniquely effective though not 
yet definitively proven so, and seriously reduce medical 
innovation and “field discovery”6 of important therapeutics. 
Questions concerning the exercise of medical judgment in 
off-label prescribing certainly reflect rational concerns for 
individual patients, but these questions also raise significant 
public policy issues relating to oversight of medical decision 
making.  Thus far, the dominant public policy response to the 
phenomenon of off-label prescribing practices addresses the 
issue as a particular breed of financial conflicts of interest in 
medicine. 
This view constructs a narrative of off-label prescribing 
that sees the financial relationships between pharmaceutical 
firms, practicing physicians, and researchers as a corrupting 
influence that pollutes medical judgment.  The conflicts-of-
interest narrative of off-label prescribing may mistakenly lead 
to an assumption that removing the confounding financial self-
interest of doctors will itself result in better prescribing 
practices.  It may be assumed that in such a purer 
environment, off-label prescribing will be more rational, 
meaning evidence-based, relying on research and information 
that will be produced and disseminated without the 
involvement of the pharmaceutical firms. 
At best, the conflicts-of-interest narrative is only a partial 
 6. The off-label use of Neurontin, the subject of the litigation discussed 
in Part III of this article, for neuropathic pain associated with shingles was 
approved by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) in 2002 after years of off-
label use for this purpose.  See infra note 232 and accompanying text. Other 
notable examples of effective, expanded uses discovered in the context of 
prescribing for off-label uses include the use of beta blockers for preventive 
care post heart attack; the use of Viagra for erectile dysfunction; and the use 
of AZT for AIDS. Jason K. Gross, Compliance Counsel and ‘Off-Label’ Issues, 
N.J. L.J., July 24, 2006, available at http://www.sillscummis.com/newsroom; 
Stephen R. Solbu, The FDA and Public Access to New Drugs: Appropriate 
Levels of Scrutiny in the Wake of HIV, AIDS, and the Diet Drug Debacle, 79 
B.U. L. REV. 93, 99–102 (1999); see also Harold J. DeMonaco et al., The Major 
Role of Clinicians in the Discovery of Off-Label Drug Therapies (Mass. Inst. 
Tech., Sloan Working Paper No. 4552-05, 2006), available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/529167 (defining “field discovery” as the 
new applications of drugs that are discovered through “clinical practice that 
[is] independent of pharmaceutical company or university research”). 
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accounting of the phenomenon of off-label prescribing.  At 
worst, the conflict-of-interest explanation of off-label 
prescribing, standing alone, will mislead regulators because it 
relies on untenable assumptions regarding the production and 
diffusion of clinical knowledge.  In either case, the conflicts-of-
interest model cannot contribute to serious efforts to 
prospectively and substantively control off-label prescribing. 
Efforts to address off-label prescribing solely as a matter of 
conflicts of interest may be important and may have some 
positive benefits, but, inevitably, public and private regulators 
will be left with the conundrum that the conflicts-of-interest 
approach dodges: off-label prescribing decisions usually operate 
in the face of serious gaps in research and knowledge.7  Efforts 
to seriously restrict this prescribing practice will operate 
without a firm evidentiary foundation for such limitations and, 
thus, will struggle with whether particular incidences or 
patterns of off-label prescribing are “correct,” in terms of 
effectiveness and an individualized and appropriate risk-
benefit analysis for the individual patient.8  Furthermore, 
strident efforts to eliminate certain pharmaceutical industry 
behaviors that create conflicts of interest may exacerbate this 
knowledge gap by both depressing the production of clinical 
research and its assimilation into medical practice. 
This paper argues that the core problem in off-label 
prescribing is not the relationship between the pharmaceutical 
industry and doctors, or at least not entirely so.  Rather, the 
prevalence of off-label prescribing is a manifestation both of 
learning patterns in the medical profession and deficiencies in 
the production and dissemination of clinical knowledge.  
Furthermore, the fraud and abuse litigation strategy currently 
 7. Radley, supra note 1, at 1021; see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE 160 
(2006) (stating that a restriction on pharmaceutical companies’ involvement in 
prescribing will likely cause a reduction in the information available for new 
drugs). 
 8. In fact, there is a significant gap in most research regarding the 
industry influences on physician prescribing behavior. The studies that 
identify the direction of the influence (i.e., increasing prescribing or request for 
inclusion in formularies) do not identify whether the change in prescribing 
produces better outcomes or otherwise benefits patients. Paul H. Rubin, An 
Uncertain Diagnosis, REG. Summer 2005 at 34, 35; EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 
160.  See generally Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic-Industrial 
Research Relationships—Solving Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1060 (2005).  See discussion infra text accompanying note 26. 
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pursued by the federal government in response to industry-
prescriber interactions around off-label prescribing buries the 
essential problem in a conflicts-of-interest framework. 
Part I of this article analyzes the impact of off-label 
prescribing patterns upon the market demand for post-
approval clinical trials.  This Part concerns itself with how 
physicians learn and how these learning patterns depress the 
production of new clinical knowledge concerning drugs that 
have already been approved for release to the market and thus 
are available for off-label prescribing.  Post-approval trials, 
usually called post-marketing or Phase IV trials, are critical to 
public health because of limitations in the testing performed 
during the drug approval process.9  In spite of the value of 
Phase IV clinical trials, regulatory requirements for post-
approval trials are nearly non-existent at this point;10 and the 
physician-prescriber market exerts only a weak demand for the 
production of clinical research on approved drugs.  Although 
demands for trials may be strengthening among other players 
in the health care market, the physician-prescriber market is 
likely to remain the core determinant of the volume of this 
research. 
Part II of this article examines the character, quality and 
volume of clinical research and its limited usefulness for 
individual prescribing decisions as well as current  deficiencies 
in the production of clinical knowledge that impede efforts by 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 72–73. The FDA approval process 
for a new drug requires clinical trials of the drug to test its safety and 
effectiveness.  Generally, these trials proceed in three phases.  Phase I trials 
test the metabolic and pharmacological behaviors of the medication in a small 
group of human subjects, typically between twenty and eighty persons, and 
are focused primarily on assessing the risks of the drugs.  Testing then 
proceeds to Phase II in which the drug is tested on a larger group of subjects 
(generally 100 to 300 individuals) and on persons with the particular disease 
or condition to which the medication is directed.  Phase III trials generally are 
the largest of the trials conducted prior to approval of a drug.  Phase III trials 
usually require 1,000 to 3,000 subjects.  Trials that are conducted after or 
concurrently with the approval of the drug are usually called Phase IV trials.  
See W. Christopher Matton & F. Scott Thomas, The Continuing Balance: 
Federal Regulation of Biotechnology, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 298–302 (2004) 
(briefly describing the FDA’s drug approval process, including clinical trials); 
Office of Inspector General, HHS, Recruiting Human Subjects: Pressures in 
Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, OEI-01-97-00195, June 2000, at 12 
(“An average of 4,237 subjects were used in New Drug Applications from 1994 
to 1995, compared with an average of 1,321 subjects from 1981 to 1984.”). 
 10. See discussion infra notes 23–24. 
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gatekeepers or regulators to move doctors, either by incentive 
or penalty, toward a stronger reliance on scientific proof of 
efficacy for off-label prescriptions.  This Part also identifies a 
relationship between established patterns of physician learning 
and the character of contemporary clinical research by 
demonstrating how efforts to control conflicts of interest in 
research, especially through disclosure, reinforce skepticism 
toward scientific research on the part of practicing physicians. 
Finally, this article examines litigation efforts targeted at 
financial relationships between doctors and pharmaceutical 
firms relating to off-label prescribing, focusing on federal 
litigation under the False Claims Act over one particular drug, 
Neurontin.  This prosecution produced a settlement of over 
$455 million and has spawned a significant body of similar 
litigation efforts.11  Part III uses the Neurontin litigation, and 
its aftermath, to highlight the limitations of the conflicts-of-
interest dominated approaches to controlling off-label 
 11. It remains the largest settlement to date for litigation focusing solely 
on the marketing, educational, and research activities of a pharmaceutical 
firm relating to off-label prescribing.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Warner-
Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal & Civil Health Care 
Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion (May 13, 2004), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm. Since that settlement, the 
government has aggressively pursued pharmaceutical firms for these 
activities, winning significant settlements. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rost 
v. Pfizer, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Mass. 2006) (regarding off-label use of human 
growth hormone.); Julie Schmit, Schering-Plough to Pay $435 Million 
Settlement, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 2006, at 1B (reporting settlement of 
government claims of fraud for promotion of off-label uses leading to the 
submission of both false claims against Medicaid as well as pricing violations); 
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company to Pay U.S. $36 Million 
Relating to Off-Label Promotion (Dec. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/05_civ_685.html (“Eli Lilly and 
Company agreed to plead guilty and to pay $36 million in connection with its 
illegal promotion of its pharmaceutical drug Evista.”); see also Robert Brady et 
al., Crackdown on “Off-Label” Pitches, NAT’L. L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at S1  
(reporting on the settlements of actions against Serono, among other cases, for 
off-label promotion of a drug to treat AIDS wasting, as well as other cases).  
Pharmaceutical companies have also filed suit over off-label promotion by 
competitors.  See, e.g., Off-Label Use: Zeneca, Maker of Nolvadex, Sues Eli 
Lilly for Claiming Evista Prevents Breast Cancer, 8 BNA-HEALTH L. REP. 392 
(1999) (“Zeneca Group PLC . . . seeks to prohibit Lilly . . . from continuing to 
market a rival product—Evista—that has not been approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration.”).  The impact of the False Claims Act litigation for off-
label promotion has also triggered private products liability class actions and 
suits by private insurers to claim payments made for prescriptions for the 
drug.  See infra notes 222–223 and accompanying text. 
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prescribing and to illustrate the information constraints that 
challenge efforts to regulate off-label prescribing more directly.  
Although the Neurontin litigation and similar cases are 
frequently proffered as an illustration of the centrality of 
conflicts of interest in the relationships among the 
pharmaceutical industry, researchers and doctors, this 
litigation is more richly studied for what it reveals about the 
nature of clinical knowledge and clinical judgment.  The 
litigation and its aftermath, including the persistence of off-
label prescribing of Neurontin, the subsequent approval of 
certain off-label uses of the drug, and the unsuccessful attempt 
of the Florida Medicaid program to restrict Neurontin 
prescribing, also raise questions about the limited impact of 
this type of litigation on prescribing patterns and illustrate the 
significant gap between controlling pharmaceutical-prescriber 
relations through civil and criminal litigation and transforming 
that effort into prospective, substantive control over 
prescribing. In addition, viewing the issues addressed in this 
article through the lens of the Neurontin litigation grounds the 
analysis in today’s reality of inadequate clinical research and 
limited efforts to disseminate new learning.  As off-label 
prescribing attracts more attention, it is critical that efforts to 
constrain the practice not outpace the information and 
dissemination resources that currently exist.12 
 12. The advent of the electronic medical record and the resultant large 
population databanks promise lower-cost post-approval research as the 
records can be mined for evidence of adverse effects as well as efficacy for off-
label prescriptions.  Unfortunately, serious information problems will remain 
even in the brave new information world.  The data may be seriously 
inadequate for assessing health outcomes and may be inaccurate.  Both the 
databank and the resultant analysis may be proprietary to the payer.  Finally, 
problems in creating adequate space for clinical innovation; access to 
unproven but effective interventions; and the translation of averages to the 
individual patient will persist.  See generally James Walker, Electronic 
Medical Records and Health Care Transformation, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1118 
(2005); Clifford Goodman, Savings in Electronic Medical Record Systems? Do 
It For the Quality, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1124 (2005).  One illustration of potential 
public-private information partnerships is the newly established partnership 
between the larger managed care organizations (MCOs) and federal agencies, 
including both the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and 
the FDA, which to this point focus almost solely on drug safety issues.  See 
Kristin Madison, ERISA and Liability for Provision of Medical Information, 84 
N.C. L. REV. 471, 502–04 (2006) (calling for effective accountability for MCOs 
as medical information providers.  Whether or not these concerns about the 
usefulness of the research constructed from the aggregation of patient records 
turn out to be well founded, these data sets are only now emerging). 
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PART I: WEAK DEMAND FOR POST-MARKETING 
CLINICAL RESEARCH 
Despite the extraordinary potential value of post-
marketing clinical research for approved drugs—in terms of 
enhancing continuing safety surveillance as well as 
encouraging broader testing on the effectiveness of medications 
for both approved and unapproved purposes—the demand for 
post-marketing studies is quite weak.  A number of factors 
converge to diminish demand for such research.  As discussed 
below, the legal framework for drug approval and drug 
prescribing encourages narrow approvals and results in broad 
off-label prescribing.  In addition, prescribing physicians 
themselves do not demand continuing research on approved 
drugs in part because of learning patterns that tend to 
minimize the impact of published studies and formal 
continuing medical education. 
State law generally creates a relatively neutral 
environment for off-label prescribing.  State liability standards, 
for example, generally do not place the physician at 
significantly increased risk of liability for off-label prescribing 
per se.  Doctors are not subject to strict liability for prescribing 
a medication off-label.  In fact, off-label use often becomes the 
customary standard of care in particular circumstances, with 
the result that doctors are at risk for malpractice liability for 
failure to prescribe an approved drug for an off-label use.  
Furthermore, liability standards typically allow a doctor to 
engage in off-label prescribing as a matter of “clinical 
innovation,” as distinguished from “experimentation” (which 
triggers heightened regulatory standards for informed consent), 
in attempting to treat individual patients.13  Nor does state 
malpractice law generally require specific disclosure by the 
physician to the patient that the particular prescribed use is 
off-label, although products liability suits against 
pharmaceutical manufacturers related to marketing of off-label 
uses have seen some success.14 
 13. FDA, “Off-label” and Investigational Use of Marketed Drugs, Biologics, 
and Medical Devices, 1998 Update, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REV. 
BOARDS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS & SPONSORS, available at http://www.fda. 
gov/oc/ohrt/irbs/offlabel.html (noting that IRB review and Investigational New 
Drug Application is not required). 
 14. Mehlman, supra note 1 (providing an overview of liability risks for off-
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The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)15 specifically 
provides that the FDA has no authority to “limit or interfere 
with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or 
administer any legally marketed [medical] device to a patient 
for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.”16  While the Act does not 
include a parallel provision for drugs, the FDA adheres to an 
identical policy for physician prescribing17 of approved 
medications including prescribing that differs in indication, 
population, dose or duration from those approved by the FDA.18  
The intention of this policy is to avoid federal interference with 
the practice of medicine,19 a somewhat quaint notion at this 
point but alive in this situation nonetheless.20 
Federal drug law, however, does more than merely permit 
label prescribing, but noting that in Richardson v. Miller the “court held that 
the fact that a drug use was off-label could be introduced as evidence that the 
prescribing physician deviated from the standard of care”); see Richardson v. 
Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Pharmaceutical firms have been 
found liable for injuries related to off-label uses when they have actively 
promoted those uses and concealed adverse effects. Proctor v. Davis, 682 
N.E.2d 1203 (Ill. App. 1997); see also Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: 
Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 
58 HASTINGS L.J. 967 (2007); Bernadette Tansey, Hard Sell: How Marketing 
Drives the Pharmaceutical Industry: A Patient’s Right to Know: How Much 
Should Doctors Disclose About Treatments Not Approved by the FDA?, S.F. 
CHRON., May 1, 2005, at A1. 
 15. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
 16. 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2000). 
 17. The FDA, however, does regulate pharmaceutical firms’ behavior in 
relation to promoting off-label uses.  The FDA prohibits pharmaceutical firms 
from marketing drugs for off-label uses, but allows companies to engage in 
limited educational and research efforts related to off-label prescribing. The 
limitations on firm behavior in relation to promotion of off-label uses are 
discussed in Part III below, in the context of the Neurontin litigation. 
 18. See 37 Fed. Reg. 16,503 (Aug. 15, 1972); see also 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440-
01 (Dec. 30, 1991).  More recently, the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act loosened FDA restrictions on the dissemination of 
information on unapproved uses of approved drugs by pharmaceutical firms to 
physicians. Pub. L. No. 105-115 § 401, 11 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); James M. Beck & Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, 
Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and Misconceptions, 
53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71 (1998). 
 19. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349–51 (2001) 
(specifically commenting on the benefits of off-label prescribing of medical 
devices and the restrictions on the FDA’s authority to interfere). 
 20. See Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling 
the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 192 (2004). 
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off-label prescribing.21  The operation of the FDCA encourages 
the proliferation of off-label uses.  Because a drug approved for 
a particular purpose is then available to the prescribing 
physician for any purpose, the regulatory structure incentivizes 
pharmaceutical firms to seek a narrow approved use, at least 
initially, in order to minimize the delay to market and reduce 
the investment in research required to meet FDA standards for 
approval.22  The FDA only rarely requires post-approval 
clinical trials as a condition of approval,23 and the agency’s 
 21. Of course, the federal government has other interests regarding off-
label prescriptions, and perhaps countervailing policies and authority as the 
largest purchaser of drugs.  As will become apparent in the later discussion of 
the Neurontin litigation, these interests have not operated as a significant 
counterweight to the incentives in the FDCA regulatory structure. See infra 
text accompanying notes 238–270. 
 22. Mitchell Oates, Facilitating Informed Medical Treatment Through 
Production and Disclosure of Research Into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals, 
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272, 1280 (2005). 
 23. The FDA has had authority to require post-marketing clinical trials in 
two circumstances: first, if the drug was approved under the fast-track 
provision for getting drugs to market in the case of life-threatening diseases; 
second, in the rarest cases where testing a drug on human beings is unethical, 
the FDA requires testing when circumstances make such testing feasible and 
ethical.  21 C.F.R. § 314.510 (2000); 21 C.F.R. § 314.610(b)(1) (2002).  In 
addition, the FDA may require post-marketing clinical trials where testing is 
needed to assure that particular drugs used by a substantial number of 
children are safe and effective for pediatric use. 21 U.S.C. 355(c) (2000).  The 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), described 
below, reauthorized the Pediatric Research Equity Act which is the source of 
this provision and appears to have significantly expanded the pediatric 
assessment required at submission for approval of a new drug.  Pub. L. No. 
110-85 § 302, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.).  Current FDA regulations do provide for post-marketing surveillance, 
requiring that the manufacturer report any new information concerning safety 
and efficacy periodically.  These regulations, however, do not require that the 
drug be submitted to formal clinical trials, but may lead to a reevaluation of 
the drug’s approval.  FDA, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, 
Postmarketing Surveillance Programs, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/ 
applications/Postmarketing/surveillancepost.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006); see 
also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, THE FUTURE OF 
DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 155–
56 (2007) (“FDA’s statutory authority to require postmarketing studies has 
been a subject of debate for decades.”).  On September 27, 2007, President 
Bush signed the FDAAA to take effect on October 1, 2007.  Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  The 
FDAAA expands the authority of the FDA to require post-approval trials, but 
only where justified by “new safety information.”  Id. § 801(a).  This may be a 
significant expansion in terms of post-approval drug safety surveillance, but it 
does not reach the bulk of clinical research required to guide prescription of 
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follow up on required trials has been lax.24  Incentives to invest 
in expanded approval25 are unev
off-label uses.  In addition, the FDAAA establishes a new process in which the 
FDA may require at initial approval or thereafter that a drug with “serious 
adverse drug experience” requires a “Risk Evaluation and Mitigation 
Strategies” (REMS) plan through which the drug would be monitored to 
assure that the benefits continue to outweigh risks.  Id. § 901(a).  Again, this 
can be an important addition to drug surveillance and safety, but does not 
respond to the broader need for post-approval clinical trials addressed in this 
article.  The FDA is required to issue regulations under this provision by fall, 
2009, so the impact of this provision is unlikely to be felt for some time.  Id. § 
9019(a); see also Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use 
of Postmarketing (Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?,  61 
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 695 (2006) (suggesting that the FDA has frequently 
negotiated a requirement of postapproval studies with pharmaceutical firms 
in the absence of clear authority to require them). 
 24. A 2006 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) study 
reported that generally the agency’s post-marketing surveillance system 
suffered from a lack of clarity, insufficient oversight, and a lack of clear 
criteria for decisions.  In addition, the GAO criticized the FDA’s follow up on 
post-marketing trials that it had required.  GAO, IMPROVEMENT NEEDED IN 
FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 36 (Mar. 
2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.  The problems 
extend to medical device issues as well as pharmaceuticals.  See FDA Briefing 
Addresses Problems in Medical Device Postmarket Surveillance System, 
KAISER DAILY HEALTH POL’Y REP., Feb. 3, 2006, available at http://www. 
kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?hint=3&DR_ID=35193.  The 
FDAAA strengthened post-marketing adverse event surveillance in several 
respects.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-85, FDAAA § 402 (requiring that all 
adverse event reports received within one year of a labeling change for 
pediatric use be forwarded to the FDA’s Office of Pediatric Therapeutics); id. § 
502(a) (requiring that all adverse events be reported by the applicant where 
pediatric studies are being conducted under the reauthorized Best 
Pharmaceuticals for Children Act); id. § 901(a) (requiring Risk Evaluation and 
Mitigation Strategies). 
 25. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70; Oates, supra note 22, at 1285 (describing 
burdensomeness of supplemental approval process). 
 26. See, e.g., Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 
115 Stat. 1408 (2002) (creating incentives for testing approved children’s 
drugs, by, in part, increasing patent protections for those drugs).  
Congress reauthorized this Act as Title V of the FDAAA and expanded the 
market exclusivity earned by firms that engage in such research. The 
intersection of patent law with the FDCA diminishes incentives for seeking 
approval of expanded uses of an approved drug.  In the context of Neurontin, 
for example, it is possible that approval of expanded uses was not sought 
because of the anticipated expiration of the patent protection of the drug.  
Department of Justice, supra note 5.  Revenue from sales of Neurontin fell 
77% when patent protection expired.  Hoover’s In-Depth Company Records, 
Pfizer, Inc. 2 (Mar.7, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 4302915.  The FDCA 
limitation on promotion of approved drugs for off-label uses targeted to 
physician-prescribers could create an incentive for seeking approval, but 
ordinarily does not do so. See infra discussion accompanying notes 28–29. The 
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Of course, the market could provide incentives for 
continuing research on approved drugs despite weak regulatory 
mandates.  If physicians in practice refused to prescribe drugs 
beyond the use, duration, population or dosage for which they 
have been approved, firms would be incentivized by the 
prescriber market to seek broader approval expeditiously.  The 
frequency and breadth of off-label prescribing, however, provide 
strong inferential evidence that doctors do not regard FDA 
approval as a necessary indicator of effectiveness (e.g., when 
they prescribe for an unapproved use) and perhaps even safety 
(e.g., when they prescribe at unapproved dosages or durations 
or for significantly distinct populations on which the drug has 
not been tested).  In view of the serious constraints of the 
formal approval process, at least in terms of the time lag and 
the capacity of the FDA, a practice of awaiting formal approval 
for each indication is impractical, may harm patients, and 
actually may violate the standard of care in particular 
circumstances.  The practice of off-label prescribing, then, 
would seem to be a rational reaction to the limitations of the 
formal approval process.27 
While prohibiting off-label prescribing by requiring formal 
FDA approval for every indication, dose, duration of therapy, 
and population for which an approved drug may be prescribed 
is impractical, practicing doctors could instead, as a general 
rule, refrain from prescribing medications until they are at 
least proven effective and safe, even if not formally approved, 
for the particular prescription contemplated.  One may argue 
that the practice of medicine, to the extent that it relies on a 
scientific model of knowledge, would demand no less than 
substantial proof of safety and effectiveness prior to off-label 
prescribing.  If doctors did so, pharmaceutical firms would 
confront a strong market demand for post-marketing clinical 
emergence of pre-emption of state products liability claims, for drugs that are 
prescribed as approved, may create an incentive for seeking formal approval of 
expanded uses, but it is too early to tell.  See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical 
Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 
623 (2007). 
 27. Some have suggested that these limitations in the drug approval 
process argue in favor of dismantling the entire system.  See, e.g., Daniel B. 
Klein & Alexander Tabarrok, Who Certifies Off-Label?, REGULATION, June 1, 
2004, at 60–62. 
JOHNSON S. POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT? FALSE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF FALSE 
CLAIMS REGARDING OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;9(1):61-124.  
2008] POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT 73 
                                                          
trials,28 and the weakness of the regulatory requirements for 
post-marketing research would become less significant. 
Practicing physicians, in fact, do not exert a high demand 
for convincing scientific proof of effectiveness for off-label uses. 
Nor do they create a robust market for scientifically valid 
information on effectiveness or even safety.29  On what 
information, then, do doctors rely in making prescribing 
decisions for off-label uses? 
The conflicts-of-interest narrative of off-label prescribing 
implies that doctors’ willingness to prescribe is simply 
purchased by the pharmaceutical industry through free 
lunches, office supplies, travel, speaker’s fees, and other more 
extravagant gifts.30  While the “doctor for sale” story may be 
 28. Of course, doctors are not the only gatekeepers for prescribed drugs.  
Most health plans and pharmaceutical benefit management programs, 
however, currently do little to confine off-label prescribing, although they are 
actively engaged in efforts to influence physician and patient demand on other 
fronts, including, for example, shifting from expensive to less expensive 
substitute formulations (“fail first” requirements), switching to generic drugs, 
creating tiered benefits or increased co-pays, requiring preauthorization, or, in 
the case of Medicaid programs, simply limiting the number of prescription 
drugs that will be reimbursed for each patient.  Stephen B. Soumerai, Benefits 
and Risks of Increasing Restrictions on Access to Costly Drugs in Medicaid, 23 
HEALTH AFF. 135 (2004) (describing these methods); J.D. Kleinke, Access 
Versus Excess: Value-Based Cost Sharing for Prescription Drugs, 23 HEALTH 
AFF. 34, 42 (2004) (noting that the private insurance sector has “mostly 
abandoned” the “command-and-control . . . and other first-generation 
management strategies” for pharmaceuticals); see Rachel Christensen Seithi, 
Prescription Drugs: Recent Trends in Utilization, Expenditures, and Coverage, 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. ISSUE BRIEF No. 265 (Jan. 2004), available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/0104ib.pdf (reporting on a general decline in 
the number of employers using substantive controls).  But see Peter J. 
Neumann, Emerging Lessons from the Drug Effectiveness Review Project, 25 
HEALTH AFF. 262 (2006). Consumer behavior can also create an incentive for 
postmarketing research and formal approval of an already approved drug for 
an off-label indication as FDA approval for the off-label use is required if the 
firms want to advertise directly to consumers.  Direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
advertising of prescription medications increases requests by patients for 
specific prescriptions, but there is a large gap between request and 
prescribing. While one survey found that approximately 35% of patients had 
discussed an advertised drug with their doctor, a 2002 GAO study reported 
that only 5% of consumers had both requested and received a prescription for 
a particular drug that had been the subject of DTC advertising.  GAO, FDA 
OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 4 (Oct. 
2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03177.pdf. 
 29. Radley, supra note 1, at 1021. 
 30. Troyen A. Brennan et al., A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to 
Physicians From Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252–53 (2003); Ashley Wazana, 
Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 
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true as far as it goes,31 a fuller appreciation of physician 
prescribing behavior requires examining how physicians 
actually learn to alter their practices, in this case to establish a 
new prescribing pattern for particular medical conditions. 
The literature on physician learning belies the common 
view of the practice of medicine as bounded by science.  In fact, 
one student of physician learning observed that doctors “have a 
deep skepticism about clinical trials, from a belief that clinical 
experience, rather than the scientific evidence should govern 
clinical practice.”32  High valuation of experience33 over studies 
permeates the observed learning patterns of practicing 
physicians, including the surprisingly limited influence of 
published studies and the relative ineffectiveness of didactic 
continuing medical education. 
Peer-reviewed journals are the gold standard for the 
publication of rigorous medical and scientific research; and 
journal articles do exert some influence on specific treatment 
decisions, but not nearly as much as one might anticipate.  One 
researcher on physician decision making, for example, has 
noted that “the universal skepticism of practicing physicians 
regarding the utility of the scientific literature is startling.”34 
JAMA 373, 373 (2000). 
 31. See discussion of lack of outcomes research in the conflicts of interest 
literature supra note 7. 
 32. Rebecca K. Schwartz et al., Physician Motivations for Nonscientific 
Drug Prescribing, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 577, 581 (1989). 
 33. Even physicians who report that they always or often use evidence-
based medicine (EBM) in making practice decisions rely instead most heavily 
on clinical experience.  Ninety-three percent of physicians in one study 
reported relying on clinical experience as an information source, and the rate 
of reliance did not differ substantially between the group reporting 
commitment to evidence-based medicine and the group that only sometimes or 
rarely/never utilized EBM in their practice.  Finlay A. McAlister et al., 
Evidence-Based Medicine and the Practicing Clinician, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL 
MED. 236, 238–39 (1999).  Reliance on clinical experience may be dangerous, 
of course.  A study of data on the impact of clinical experience, in terms of 
years of practice concluded that, in fact, experience may have an inverse 
relationship with health outcomes, compliance with screening 
recommendations, and information base for prescribing.  Niteesh K. Choudhry 
et al., Systematic Review: The Relationship Between Clinical Experience and 
Quality of Health Care, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 260 (2005). 
 34. Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the 
Science: The Diffusion of New Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT’L J. 
TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 5, 9 (1988); see also H.B. Slotnick, How 
Doctors Learn: Physicians’ Self-directed Learning Episodes, 74 ACAD. MED., 
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There is also evidence that even when physicians do review 
professional journals for relevant information for clinical 
decision making, they are likely to fail to distinguish between 
rigorous studies and preliminary studies;35 may be limited in 
their ability to assess the strength of any particular study;36 
and may in fact rely excessively on abstracts, overlooking 
instances in which the abstract may overstate results.37  In 
addition, critics of peer-reviewed journals as a source of 
guidance for clinical decision making have noted that journals 
are not focused on the practitioner and often mix reports of a 
few rigorous trials with many preliminary studies, making it 
difficult for the practitioner (who may skip the methodology 
section) to be discriminating in evaluating the quality of 
information.38  Physicians also may be as influenced by letters 
and case reports published in journals, which can be merely 
anecdotal, as by sound scientific studies.39  The reliance on 
anecdotal, informal reports is consistent with observations of a 
higher trust level for clinical experience over clinical trials. 
Written clinical guidelines standing alone also have proven 
relatively ineffective in changing practice patterns.40  While the 
lack of influence of clinical guidelines may be attributed simply 
1106, 1110 (1999) (stating that when addressing specific, acute needs, doctors 
tend to rely on readily available literature and discussions with colleagues—
they are more likely to refer to medical journals for guidance in addressing 
general problems). 
 35. R.B. Haynes, Loose Connections Between Peer-Reviewed Clinical 
Journals and Clinical Practice, 113 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 724, 725 (1990). 
 36. Only 34% of physician respondents in one survey reported that they 
had confidence in their ability to evaluate the methodology of a study on their 
own, and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search.  McAlister et al., 
supra note 33. 
 37. One study of how residents learn, for example, observed that even the 
“librarian residents,” a term used to describe those residents who reported 
reading as a source of information, were most likely to read only the abstracts 
and conclusions of articles.  Stefan Timmermans & Alison Angell, Evidence-
Based Medicine, Clinical Uncertainty, and Learning to Doctor, 42 J. HEALTH & 
SOC. BEHAV. 342, 345–47 (2001). 
 38. Haynes, supra note 35. 
 39. Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard 
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 
397 n.40 (2002).  In one survey doctors reported that they referred to “review 
articles” in journals (73%) but that they did not refer to “research studies” 
(45%).  McAlister, supra note 33 at 236. 
 40. See, e.g., James Ducharme, Clinical Guidelines and Policies: Can They 
Improve Emergency Department Pain Management?, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
783 (2005). 
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to physician resistance to “cookbook medicine,” the more 
intractable problem is the quality of most clinical guidelines.  
For example, guidelines frequently produce only the most 
general guidance, in part because of the dearth of clinical 
research required to ground more specific, and perhaps more 
influential, guidelines.41  Thus, guidelines often must rely 
extensively on “expert opinion” or consensus (a.k.a. committee) 
efforts rather than data.  Further, to the extent that specific 
guidelines rely on the aggregation of published research 
studies, they may simply incorporate biases in that literature.42 
Perhaps because of their trust of experience over controlled 
studies, doctors may tend to rely on opinions of respected peers 
and opinion leaders within the profession rather than on 
clinical studies or clinical guidelines standing alone.  Deference 
to “group think” and to a hierarchy of opinion may be a learned 
pattern of decision making adopted in the doctor’s experience of 
residency training where the opinion of the attending physician 
is revered as authoritative.43  Studies document significant 
influence of peer opinions on clinical decision making,44 
although some studies conclude that the context for the 
transmission of opinions may make a difference in effect on 
practice.45 
Documentation of medical practice patterns corroborates 
 41. See Sean R. Tunis et al., Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the 
Value of Clinical Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 
290 JAMA 1624, 1625 (2003).  See generally Noah supra note 39 (discussing 
practice guidelines). 
 42. Kleinke, supra note 28, at 36 (detailing the impact of bias in the 
development of guidelines for the use of pharmaceuticals). 
 43. Timmermans, supra note 37, at 345–47. 
 44. See, e.g., Jane M. Young et al., Role for Opinion Leaders in Promoting 
Evidence-Based Surgery, 138 ARCHIVES SURGERY 785, 785, 789 (2003) 
(reporting that 88% of surgeons surveyed agreed that they had colleagues who 
would be influential in altering their own practice, and 93.8% reported that 
clinical opinion leaders in surgery were very or somewhat likely to influence 
their practice patterns).  Surgeons reported that opinion leaders were more 
influential than clinical audits or clinical practice guidelines.  Id.  At the same 
time, however, surgeons in this survey reported that peer-reviewed surgical 
literature influenced their practice as well.  Id. 
 45. At least one study indicates that the influence of opinion leaders 
varies along the same lines as the influence of continuing medical education 
described below.  A. Wadhwa et al., A Qualitative Study of Interphysician 
Telephone Consultations: Extending the Opinion Leader Theory, 25 J. CONTIN. 
EDUC. HEALTH PROF. 98, 102 (2005). 
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the reported reliance on peers and opinion leaders as these 
studies reveal interregional practice heterogeneity as well as 
intraregional homogeneity.46  One might expect that if 
physicians relied on scientific research results for medical 
decision making, neither the variations among geographic 
areas nor the homogeneity within regions would be so 
pronounced. 
Journals are not the only tool for formal learning in 
medical practice.  Continuing medical education (CME) is so 
highly valued as a vehicle for updating clinical knowledge that 
it is a routine licensure requirement for practicing physicians 
and is often used as a rehabilitative mechanism in physician 
discipline.47  CME, however, is largely ineffective in achieving 
its ultimate goal of improving practice. 
A significant study analyzing empirical studies of the 
impact of CME on practice decision making concluded that 
studies consistently demonstrated that formal, didactic CME 
exerts only a weak effect on practice patterns.48  Lecture and 
case-based CMEs, which are the custom of the trade, can 
change information levels but do not change practice.  The 
authors of one article found that traditional didactic CME “has 
little or no role to play” in changing practice.49  A later analysis 
confirmed this conclusion and noted that such programs “have 
little or no beneficial effect in changing physician practice.”50  
 46. The classic studies on interregional variations and intraregional 
homogeneities in practice were done by John E. Wennberg.  See, e.g., John E. 
Wenberg Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, 3 
HEALTH AFF. 6 (1984); see also K. McPherson et al., Small-Area Variations in 
the Use of Common Surgical Procedures: An International Comparison of New 
England, England, and Norway, 21 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1307, 1310–14 (1982).  
The studies on interregional heterogeneity and local homogeneity of surgical 
practice may contradict survey data of surgeons’ self-reported higher reliance 
on peer-reviewed literature than on local colleagues.  Young, supra note 44. 
 47. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. § 2190; MO. REV. STAT. § 330.160; see also 
David A. Davis et al., Accuracy of Physician Self-Assessment Compared with 
Observed Measures of Competence: A Systematic Review, 296 JAMA 1094, 
1094–95 (2006) (describing CME requirements of state medical licensure 
bodies, the Joint Commission, the specialty boards, and others). 
 48. David Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education, 
282 JAMA 867, 873 (1999).   
 49. Id. at 873. 
 50. B.S. Bloom, Effects of Continuing Medical Education on Improving 
Clinical Care and Patient Health: A Review of Systematic Reviews, 21 INT’L J. 
TECH. ASSESS. HEALTH CARE 380, 380 (2005); see also W. Sohn et al., Efficacy 
of Educational Interventions Targeting Primary Care Providers’ Practice 
Behaviors: An Overview of Published Systematic Reviews, 64 J. PUB. HEALTH 
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Doctors absorb new information, but do not necessarily 
incorporate it into their decision making. 
Some CME pedagogies can effect change in practice.51  In 
particular, multiple contacts between instructor and student 
following a learn-work-learn sequence; information provided at 
the point of an expressed need to know; comparative 
information on the practice of other physicians; enabling 
materials that assist in interactions with patients (such as 
patient education sheets, reminders, and such); mailed 
materials followed up with personal phone calls; and proctoring 
and shadowing all show more significant effects than the 
standard CME.52  Most CME, however, is the standard lecture-
format didactic CME,53 while most pharmaceutical detailing 
(one-on-one representative-physician marketing) utilizes the 
very same pedagogical methods that have been documented as 
effective in changing practice in the CME context.54 
A Kaiser Family Foundation survey of doctors found that 
74% thought information provided by drug representatives was 
useful and 81% believed that the information was at least 
DENTISTRY 164, 170–71 (2004). 
 51. A 2004 article, for example, reported that an “interactive, case-based, 
educational intervention . . . using a series of interactive case-based 
teleconferences” effected a change in prescribing for asthma even though 
clinical guidelines recommending such prescribing had been ineffective in 
changing practice in over ten years.  R.S. Davis et al., Changing Physician 
Prescribing Patterns Through Problem-Based Learning, 93 ANNALS ALLERGY 
ASTHMA IMMUNOLOGY 237, 237 (2004); see also Paul E. Mazmanian & David 
A. Davis, Continuing Medical Education and the Physician as a Learner, 288 
JAMA 1057, 1059–60 (2002). 
 52. Davis, supra note 48, at 870–71;  see also F. Daniel Duffy & Eric S. 
Holmboe,  Self-assessment in Lifelong Learning and Improving Performance in 
Practice, 296 JAMA 1137, 1138 (2006) (discussing the importance of self-
identified learning needs as motivational tools for more effective CME). 
 53. Bloom, supra note 50, at 381. 
 54. Robert Cohen, “Unsales Pitches” Counter Drug Reps: Program Gives 
Doctors Alternative Advice, Tips, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.) Sept. 9, 2007, 
at 1 (quoting founder of program that brings academic physicians to doctors’ 
offices to discuss prescribing: “[d]rug companies are awfully talented and 
effective in changing doctors’ prescribing behavior . . . . People in academia . . . 
tend to be lousy communicators, and we are not very effective in changing 
doctors’ prescribing practices.”); Wayne Kondro, Academic Drug Detailing: An 
Evidence-Based Alternative, 176 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 429, 430 (2007) 
(describing shift in independent drug education program from written reports 
to office visits); Scott A. Kale et al., Teaching Doctors to Fish, MED. 
MARKETING & MEDIA, Nov. 1, 2007, at 46 (describing methods of making 
experts available to doctors and providing materials for patients). 
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somewhat accurate.55  Of course, this may be due to the “free 
lunch” that comes with the information,56 but it may also be 
due to the more effective pedagogical methods—methods that 
are responsive to clinical practice—used in this form of CME. 
Once established, or once learned, practice and prescribing 
patterns are hard to alter.  Some studies of off-label prescribing 
reveal habitual patterns among a significant segment of 
physicians.57  Habit may persist even when serious safety 
concerns emerge.  For example, while changes in drug labeling 
regarding warnings of previously unknown, serious risks are 
often mailed or faxed directly to physicians, studies indicate 
that these mailings do not result in changes in prescribing 
practice—that physicians frequently prescribed drugs in 
violation of warnings, including black box warnings.58  Of 
 55. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF PHYSICIANS PART II: 
DOCTORS AND PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2002). 
 56. See, e.g., Troyen A.  Brennan, Health Industry Practices That Create a 
Conflict of Interest, 295 JAMA 429 (2006); Dana Katz, All Gifts Large and 
Small, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39 (2003); Wazana, supra note 30, at 378 (reporting 
on studies that document increased prescribing associated with 
pharmaceutical gifts; a positive disposition toward drug representatives; an 
increase in physician requests to add a specific drug to the hospital’s or 
insurer’s formulary in association with gifting; and doctors’ inability to 
distinguish grounded from ungrounded claims).  These studies do not measure 
patient outcomes subsequent to prescribing changes, however.  Id.  
Furthermore, some studies recognize specific positive effects, including 
“improved ability to identify the treatment for complicated illnesses.”  Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Judith K. Hellerstein, The Demand for Post-Patent 
Prescription Pharmaceuticals (December 1994) (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.Res., 
Working Paper No. W4981), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=226580. 
 58. Jerry H. Gurwitz, Serious Adverse Drug Effects—Seeing the Trees 
Through the Forest, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1413, 1414 (2006).  Black box 
warnings are the most severe warnings the FDA can issue for a drug that is to 
remain on the market despite newly discovered adverse effects.  See K.E. 
Lasser, Adherence to Black Box Warnings for Prescription Medications in 
Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 338, 338 (2006) (reporting that 
doctors in the study prescribed medications subject to black box warnings to 
seven of one thousand outpatients, with female patients and patients over 
seventy-five-years-old more likely to receive the medications; that fewer than 
1% of patients who received such drugs had an adverse drug event; and that 
“few incidents resulted in detectable harm”); A.K. Wagner, FDA Drug 
Prescribing Warnings: Is the Black Box Half Empty or Half Full?, 15 
PHARMACOEPIDEMIOLOGY & DRUG SAFETY 369, 375 (2006) (reporting that 
more than 40% of patients studied received a medication subject to a black box 
warning applicable to their situation, including some specifically applicable to 
pregnancy and that most of the non-compliance observed involved the absence 
of baseline laboratory monitoring that should have accompanied the drug 
therapy). 
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course, part of the paradox in drug approval and post-
marketing surveillance is evident in the case of black box 
warnings in which the particular medication is not removed 
from the market, but physicians are to be “cautious” in 
prescribing because of risks discovered post-approval.  There 
may be good reasons for a doctor to continue prescribing a drug 
with a black box warning, for example, because it is more 
effective for the particular patient and that gain in 
effectiveness outweighs the newly discovered risks.  Thus, 
continued prescribing of medication with a black box warning 
in a particular case may be evidence of inappropriate habitual 
prescribing, or it may be an exercise of appropriate medical 
judgment.59 
The learning and information preferences observed in 
physicians are common coping tools for managing massive 
amounts of information.60  The inclination to emulate their 
peers in their practice decisions, to look to physician opinion 
leaders, and to trust experience rather than to rely on 
published scientific studies or formal FDA approval all assist 
physicians in managing the information environment of 
modern medical practice.  The amount of medical information 
available to a physician is overwhelming: for example, Medline 
adds 30,000 citations to its database each month.61  Although 
Medline and other medical research databases are searchable, 
doctors report a low confidence level in their ability to do a 
 59. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASS’N COUNCIL ON SCI. AFF., REPORT 10 (A-05): 
SAFETY AND EFFICACY OF SELECTIVE SEROTONIN REUPTAKE INHIBITORS 
(SSRIS) IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (2005), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/15186.html. 
[The American Medical Association . . .] recognizes that the current 
product labeling (package insert) of antidepressant drugs, including 
the Black Box warnings, is a precautionary statement intended to 
reinforce the need for careful monitoring of patients with depression 
and other psychiatric disorders during the initiation of treatment.  
This product labeling should not be interpreted in a way that would 
decrease access for patients who may benefit from these drugs. 
This became American Medical Association (AMA) policy H-115.971 Safety 
and Efficacy of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) in Children 
and Adolescents.  After reviewing the evidence, the AMA concluded that the 
association between the antidepressants and rates of suicide was not 
supported by data.  Mark Moran, AMA Opposes Restrictions on SSRI Use in 
Youngsters, 40 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1, 1 (2005), available at http://pn. 
psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/40/14/1-b. 
 60. Noah, supra note 39, at 402–03. 
 61. Id. 
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literature search on a particular question.62 
Similarly, informal communication networks among peers 
allow physicians to transmit information much more quickly 
than peer-reviewed journals can. Especially in certain practice 
areas, oncology for example, the demand for access to a drug 
may outpace the demand for scientific verification (for example, 
through completion of ongoing but incomplete clinical trials) of 
the information that is being shared.63  Furthermore, 
information gathered from peers comes with an interpretative 
framework of experience that is valued in medicine.64 
These learning preferences show us a construct of patients 
as highly variable and medical practice as highly intuitive and 
reliant on judgment or discretion.  The averages produced in 
scientific studies will not necessarily account for the individual 
patient presenting to the individual physician, and this 
problem of heterogeneity extends to individualized responses to 
medications.65 
Finally, in a tradition-oriented profession like medicine, 
there is safety in the herd.  Malpractice and professional 
disciplinary standards, to the extent that they compare an 
individual doctor’s decisions to a national or community 
custom, reinforce reliance on peer example by rewarding those 
who assure that their practice is within the mainstream.  In 
some instances, regulatory agencies have used departure from 
majority prescribing practices as indicia of criminal or licensure 
violations.66 
Unwillingness to rely on scientific studies as essential for 
prescribing may reflect patterns of learning and practice that 
are simply resistant to scientific evidence regardless of the 
quality of information available.  Reliance on peers and peer 
practices may also be a response to ineffective dissemination of 
knowledge through other outlets, including both journal 
articles and continuing medical education programs.  In 
 62. McAlister et al., supra note 33. 
 63. Klein & Tabarrok, supra note 27, at 60. 
 64. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 65. Heterogeneity is a particular problem in the responsiveness of 
patients to particular medications, both in terms of effectiveness and adverse 
effects.  Soumerai, supra note 28, at 143; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 
118–20. 
 66. See, e.g., Symposium, Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing 
the Clinical, Legal, and Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 285 
(1996). 
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addition to these considerations, deficiencies in the production 
and quality of clinical knowledge, discussed in the next section, 
may actually reinforce clinicians’ skepticism of the utility of 
research studies in their prescribing decisions. 
PART II: THE LIMITED UTILITY OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
FOR OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING DECISIONS 
If off-label uses of an approved medication are to be tested 
at all, those tests, by definition, will be conducted after the 
drug is approved for the market.  As discussed earlier, the FDA 
does not ordinarily require significant post-marketing clinical 
research as a condition of approval of a particular drug, even 
though it has some authority to do so.  Furthermore, 
prescribing doctors do not exert strong market demand for post-
marketing research for off-label prescribing.  Weak demand for 
post-marketing research, both through regulatory channels and 
in the prescribing market,67 has produced an insufficient 
supply of clinical knowledge for off-label prescribing.  This gap 
certainly exists in the case of non-approved uses.  It also, 
however, exists in the (potentially more common) incidents of 
off-label prescribing of approved medications for untested 
patient populations in which there may be significant 
disparities in effectiveness and safety of the drug (e.g., certain 
drugs tested only on men but prescribed for women and drugs 
tested only on adults but prescribed for children).  Additionally, 
the gap exists when drugs are prescribed for doses or durations 
(e.g., long-term instead of short-term) that have not been tested 
in clinical trials prior to approval. 
Off-label prescribing is not unique in raising the issue of 
insufficient clinical research.  The negative impact of the 
insufficiency in the production of Phase IV clinical trials 
extends to all prescribing, including off-label prescribing and 
prescribing within the scope of approval.  Phase IV studies 
typically will be the first in which very large numbers of 
persons are studied.  For comparison, Phase III trials, the 
largest of the pre-approval trials, ordinarily involve only 1,000 
to 3,000 people,68 a number that is too small to reveal 
 67. See supra Part I. 
 68. See supra note 9. 
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uncommon, though quite serious, adverse effects.69  In 
addition, the pre-approval trials are time-limited, while post-
marketing trials can extend for a much longer time, again 
increasing the likelihood that adverse events that arise only 
with very long-term use will be detected.  In addition, pre-
approval trials generally rely on a “naïve” subject population, 
one that will not present the risk of drug interactions because 
these interactions may confound the results for the tested 
drug.70  Once available for prescribing, however, the approved 
drug will be used by patients taking any number of other 
medications.  Phase IV trials often present the first opportunity 
for testing the risks of drug interactions.  Equally importantly, 
approved medications are prescribed for individuals, including 
both the elderly and children as well as individuals with 
medical conditions such as diabetes, in whom the medication 
may behave quite differently in terms of both effect and 
safety.71  These differences are likely to be detected only in the 
post-marketing phase of research.72  Finally, the FDA does not 
require proof of comparative efficacy for approval of a new 
medication, so trials that compare one drug to another usually 
take place, if at all, only after 
oved.73 
Weak demand for post-marketing clinical trials results in 
inadequate numbers of these trials to meet the needs of 
practicing physicians.  The problem for clinical decision making 
 69. Richard Gliklich, Keeping Approvals on Track, 14 APPLIED CLINICAL 
TRIALS 28, 28, 30 (2005). 
 70. Id. at 28–29. 
 71. Scott Gottlieb, Opening Pandora’s Pillbox: Using Modern Information 
Tools to Improve Drug Safety, 24 HEALTH AFF. 938, 939 (2005) (“There is little 
chance that [preapproval] trials will ever provide a complete review of how a 
new treatment will perform when it is used in much broader populations of 
patients in real-world clinical settings.”). 
 72. DeMonaco et al., supra note 6. 
 73. See David B. Ross, The FDA and the Case of Ketek, 356 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1601, 1601 (2007) (discussing change in FDA policy reducing 
requirements for noninferiority trials as part of approval processes). Those 
comparative studies currently conducted can suffer from design flaws relating 
to whether the appropriate dosage is chosen for the comparable drug and 
other issues.  K.J. Jørgensen et al., Flaws in Design, Analysis and 
Interpretation of Pfizer’s Antifungal Trials of Voriconazole and Uncritical 
Subsequent Quotations, 7 TRIALS 3 (2006); see  Valeria Frighi, Medical 
Journals, Academia, and Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials,  2 PLOS MED.7, 
e218 0686, 0686 (2005); J. Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry 
Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. 
MED. J. 1167, 1170 (2003), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/. 
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regarding off-label prescribing is not one entirely of sheer 
volume but includes quality concerns as well.  The quality of 
current post-approval clinical trials falls short of meeting the 
needs of prescribers.  The first quality concern emerges from 
the presumed impact of the source of funding for the bulk of 
clinical trials.  The second quality concern arises from the gap 
between the design of clin
UBLIC AND PRIVATE FUNDING 
Randomized controlled clinical trials are expensive.  The 
large number of subjects involved and long lifespan of Phase IV 
trials make them particularly expensive.  The pharmaceutical 
industry is not the only source of financing for post-marketing 
clinical research; but it is the biggest by far.74  The federal 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) has been expanding its 
commitment to clinical research of late, but in recent years has 
only spent 30% of its budget (approximately $850 million) on 
pharmaceutical clinical trials of all types, including Phase I, II, 
III and Phase IV trials.75  The federal Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (AHRQ) spends approximately $30 
million annually on clinical trials, although again not only 
Phase IV trials.76  The Veterans’ Administration has conducted 
some significant trials of medical interventions, but its budget 
for such research is only approximately $55 million per year, 
and again not devoted entirely to pharmaceutical research.77  
The Centers for Education and Research in Therapeutics, a 
joint FDA-AHRQ effort aimed at improving the production of 
clinical knowledge, has an annual budget of $7 million to 
support clinical trials of drugs.78 The Medicare program has 
also begun to “fund” clinical research studies on its own 
 74. The proportion of public to private dollars for clinical research is likely 
to move in the direction of decreasing public support.  Researchers Should Rely 
Less on NIH Grants, More on Industry Funding, Bush Adviser Says, 6 MED. 
RES. L. & POL’Y REP.,  May 16, 2007, at d4. 
 75. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1628. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. AHRQ, FACT SHEET CENTER FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH ON 
THERAPEUTICS (CERTS) (2004), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ 
certsovr.pdf. 
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interventions.79  In comparison to the approximately $950 
million of federal money devoted to all phases of clinical trials, 
pharmaceutical firms may be spending as much as $8 to $12 
billion on post-marketing trials alone.80  Although private 
insurers and pharmacy benefits management programs are 
beginning to produce clinical research on approved drugs, this 
nascent effort is confined largely to collecting data from the 
pharmaceutical industry.81  Even if this effort increases, the 
information produced may be viewed as proprietary. 
Critics have raised substantial concerns over 
 79. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL COVERAGE 
DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVERAGE: 
COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT § VI (2006), available at 
https://www.cms.hhs.gov/pf/printpage.asp?ref=http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/nc
pc_view_document.asp?id=8; see also Sandra J. Carnahan, Medicare’s 
Coverage with Study Participation Policy: Clinical Trials or Tribulations, 7 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 229, 231 (2007); see also discussion of data 
collection by private insurers, supra note 12. 
 80. See, e.g., CUTTING EDGE INFO., MASTERING PHASE IV CLINICAL TRIALS 
(2007) (estimating expenditures of $12 billion), available at http://www. 
cuttingedgeinfo.com/postmarketingtrials/index.htm?type=GoogleAdWordsCont
ent&gclid=CNPzsKf2to8CFQUsPAodGyBDeA.  The same study said firms 
spent an average of 14% of their total research and development budgets on 
post-marketing trials.  Phase 4 Clinical Trials Claim an Average of 14% of 
R&D Budgets, Study Says, MARKETWIRE, Nov. 14, 2007, http://www. 
marketwire.com/mw/release.do?id=792873; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 7–8 (2006), 
available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 76xx/doc7615/10-02-DrugR-D.pdf (reporting 
annual industry spending on all R & D of $38 million, and National Science 
Foundation estimate that 20% of that is spent on post-marketing research 
which the NSF excludes from its calculation of pharmaceutical R & D).  Some 
of the expenditure reported by industry in support of post-marketing trials is 
more appropriately allocated to marketing efforts that may be enfolded in 
these trials.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 7, at 145.  As with all of the figures for 
research and development investment by pharmaceutical firms, estimated 
expenditures come from the industry itself and estimates vary.  See, e.g., GAO, 
NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
EFFORTS, 4, 39 (2006) (reporting that industry spent $40 billion on all 
research and development in 2004 but stating that the GAO “did not 
independently verify these expenditure data; . . . and they represent the best 
available information at the time of our study”). 
 81. See, e.g., Peter J. Neumann, Evidence-Based and Value-Based 
Formulary Guidelines, 23 HEALTH AFF. 124 (2004).  Interestingly, the 
Neurontin settlement, discussed in Part III, is providing grants to 
organizations to study prescribing patterns and provide education to doctors 
and consumers concerning sources of information for prescription drugs.  
Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, AG Myers & Kitzhaber Address A “1st of 
Its Kind” Conference in Portland (Dec. 4, 2006), available at http://www.doj. 
state.or.us/releases/2006/rel120406.shtml. 
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pharmaceutical industry support for research even though it is 
essential to the production of clinical knowledge due to 
seriously inadequate public funding.  The vigorous debate over 
industry support of clinical trials challenges the credibility of 
clinical research on which clinical, management, and 
regulatory decisions, at least theoretically, should rely.  
Furthermore, the resulting credibility crisis may have a 
nonspecific but pervasive effect on the uptake of clinical 
research results into medical practice, especially if physician 
learning and decision making is already skeptical of the utility 
of scientific studies.82  Finally, the quality of clinical research 
limits its utility for public and private controls over physician 
prescribing.  If clinical studies are biased, then public and 
private efforts to control prescribing rely on defective 
information.83 
B. WHOSE BIAS? 
In January of 2003, Bekelman et al. published a watershed 
article on the impact of funding source on research results.84  
In this article, they performed a meta-analysis of 37 published 
quantitative studies that compared the source of funding with 
the outcomes of 1140 biomedical studies, many of which were 
drug studies.85  The Bekelman study thus examined the 
aggregation of data over several studies of single drugs or other 
medical interventions.86  The authors concluded that the 
sponsorship of a study was very closely associated with the 
outcome reported, even in the case of random controlled trials: 
“Strong and consistent evidence shows that industry-sponsored 
research tends to draw pro-industry conclusions. . . . [W]e found 
that industry-sponsored studies were significantly more likely 
 82. See supra notes 26 & 28. 
 83. See infra text accompanying note 87. 
 84. Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of 
Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454 (2003); 
see also Mohit Bhandari et al., Association Between Industry Funding and 
Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings in Medical and Surgical 
Randomized Trials, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 477, 477 (2004); James F. Fries & 
Eswar Krishnan, Equipoise, Design Bias, and Randomized Controlled Trials: 
The Elusive Ethics of New Drug Development, 6 ARTHRITIS RES. & THERAPY 3, 
R250 (2004), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/; Lexchin et al., 
supra note 73, at 1167. 
 85. See Bekelman et al., supra note 84, at 456. 
 86. Id. 
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to reach conclusions that were favorable to the sponsor than 
were nonindustry studies.”87 
The pattern of “pro-industry conclusions,” as the authors 
termed the phenomenon, was pronounced in several 
instances.88  For example, studies of the results of articles on 
calcium channel blockers reported that 51% of authors with 
industry funding reported positive results in trials of the drugs, 
while 0% of authors of studies that were not sponsored by 
interested firms reported positive results.89  Other studies 
showed less dramatic differences, but a difference of 
approximately 20% was common when comparing the rate of 
positive and negative outcomes over the aggregated studies of 
particular drugs or other interventions.90 
It is indicative of this time of turmoil in clinical research 
that it’s not clear where the blame lies for the observed bias in 
studies reviewed, accepted and published in medical journals.  
Does the association of sponsorship with positive results reflect 
bias on the part of the industry-funded researcher?91  Or is the 
bias the result of the pharmaceutical firms’ selectivity in 
choosing to fund only studies with a high likelihood of positive 
outcome, thereby strengthening the market for their product?92  
Or is the bias produced by research contracts or grants in 
which the sponsor retains the unilateral right to release results 
for publication or not, allowing the sponsor to control the flow 
of information through the journals to the medical market?93  
 87. Id. at 463. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 456. 
 90. Id. at 458. 
 91. The Bekelman article considers several factors contributing to 
disproportionately positive results, but does not list individual researcher bias 
among those.  Bekelman et al., supra note 84, at 463.  But see Catherine D. 
DeAngelis, Editorial, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA 
996, 996 (2006). 
 92. See, e.g., Fries & Krishnan, supra note 84.  The authors hypothesize 
that “extensive preliminary data are used to design [industry-funded] studies 
with a high likelihood of being positive.”  Id. at R250.  They further report that 
company consultants and staff review “what is known about the drug, its 
competitors, its potential advantages in terms of toxicity or efficacy, and the 
potential disease indications” and then design trials that include the “patients, 
dosages, study duration, end-points, and comparators that are likely to 
provide a positive result for the sponsor and one that is acceptable to the 
F.D.A.”  Id. at R252. 
 93. In a 1986 survey of research faculty, 24% of those funded by industry 
reported restrictions on publication of study results compared to 5% of those 
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Or do the journals themselves contribute to selection bias by 
rejecting studies that “show that a new treatment is inferior to 
standard treatment” or “that are neither clearly positive nor 
clearly negative”?94 
Any one of these reasons casts doubt on the reliability not 
only of a single published article, but even more significantly on 
the entire body of published research about a particular drug.  
Systemic bias has serious implications for the aggregation of 
published results.  Such aggregation of results supplies the 
“evidence” for evidence-based medicine for practice guidelines 
and consensus statements for treatment decisions.95 If 
published results in the aggregate show a bias toward “pro-
industry” conclusions, the disutility of published clinical trials 
becomes apparent and raises a critical issue for the practicing 
physician.  Moreover, any gatekeeper, governmental or private, 
with other funding for research.  D. Blumenthal et al., University-Industry 
Research Relationships in Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 232 
SCIENCE 1361, 1364 (1986); cf. Richard Smith, Essay, Medical Journals Are an 
Extension of the Marketing Arm of Pharmaceutical Companies, 2 PLOS MED. 
0364, 0365 (2005), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ (reporting 
that suppression of results is “too crude” a method for influencing the body of 
published work and reviewing other methods that can achieve the same 
effect).  In fact, Bekelman et al. report that suppression of data is less likely in 
industry-sponsored studies than in studies in which the researcher is “in the 
process of bringing their research results to market.” Bekelman et al., supra 
note 84, at 463.  See generally infra notes 134–37 and accompanying text 
(discussing the Bayh-Dole Act). 
 94. Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International 
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250, 1250 
(2004); see also J.D. Kleinke, supra note 28, at 35–36 (discussing the tendency 
of journals toward publishing articles that expand the use of more aggressive 
and more expensive drug therapies); Smith, supra note 93, at 0365 (describing 
a strategy of publishing the results of multi-center trials in a number of 
publications as separate results to produce a body of research that shows a 
high frequency of positive results, a strategy that directly benefits publishers 
of medical journals as well as the manufacturer). 
 95. Experts review the aggregation of study results when developing 
clinical practice guidelines and consensus statements.  A study of such 
experts, however, found that 87% had financial connections to pharmaceutical 
firms.  Niteesh K. Choudhry et al., Relationships Between Authors of Clinical 
Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 287 JAMA 612, 614 
(2002).  These relationships may have no effect on the content of the 
guidelines.  See Bekelman et al., supra note 84, at 463. See generally David G. 
Duvall, Conflict of Interest or Ideological Divide, 22 CURRENT MED. RES. & 
OPINION 1807 (2006).  The use of expert opinion in the development of 
guidelines also illustrates the reliance on peer and leader opinions in medical 
decision making.  See supra text accompanying notes 28–34. 
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that aims at controlling individual prescribing decisions by 
reference to published clinical studies must also contend with 
this suspect reliability. 
The Bekelman piece is only one example of the mounting 
concern over bias in published clinical studies.  In the four 
years since this watershed analysis, the trickle of concern over 
the validity and purity of research results published in the 
gold-standard peer-reviewed journals has grown into a 
torrent.96  In a summer 2006 editorial, Dr. Catherine 
DeAngelis, the editor-in-chief of JAMA, identified a litany of 
examples of “research irregularities” in research sponsored by 
“for-profit companies.”97  These examples include “refusal to 
provide all study data to the study team, reporting only 6 
months of data in a trial designed to have 12 months of 
data . . . ; incomplete reporting of serious adverse events; and 
concealing clinical trial data showing harm.”98  She further 
detailed her concerns that industry sponsorship of clinical 
studies can “exert inappropriate influence in research via 
control of study data and statistical analysis, ghostwriting, 
managing all or most aspects of manuscript preparation, and 
dictating to investigators the journals to which they should 
submit their manuscripts,” noting that some companies are 
rumored to be preventing researchers from publishing in JAMA 
because of its conflicts-of-interest requirements.99  Many share 
 96. Although the following discussion focuses on the issues arising in the 
publication of clinical studies, research centers also have established policies 
to manage conflicts of interest in the conduct of research.  For example, the 
American Association of Medical Colleges has recommended that medical 
research universities establish conflict-of-interest policies.  Press Release, 
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., AAMC Urges Speedy Adoption of NIH Conflict of 
Interest Reforms (May 6, 2004), available at http://www.aamc.org/ newsroom/ 
pressrel/2004/040506.htm; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO PROTECT AGAINST 
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 3 (2003), available at http://www.eric.ed. 
gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/1b/9c/c1.pdf  
(reporting that all of the 171 universities surveyed had conflicts-of-interest 
policies for their researchers and that 87% of research universities had policies 
that complied with NIH and NSF guidelines); infra, text accompanying notes 
162–163 (discussing governmental policies on conflicts of interest). See 
generally Peter J. Harrington, Faculty Conflicts of Interest in an Age of 
Academic Entrepreneurialism: An Analysis of the Problem, the Law and 
Selected University Policies, 27 J.C. & U.L. 775 (2001) (discussing a variety of 
conflicts of interest, focusing on those with industry). 
 97. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 996. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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DeAngelis’ concerns,100 and the behaviors she identifies are 
well documented.101  In addition to JAMA’s adventures, the 
New England Journal of Medicine dealt with its own 
controversy with industry-supported research when, after 
publishing the results of clinical trials of Vioxx, it published 
notices stating that Merck may have intentionally altered the 
evidence.102 
Conflicts-of-interest analysis, which has framed the debate 
over industry funding of clinical trials, can go only so far in 
responding to the crisis in the reliability, real or perceived, of 
clinical research.103  As most critics acknowledge, 
pharmaceutical industry support for clinical research has 
significant benefits, and it is highly unrealistic to think that 
 100. The most prominent critique of the pharmaceutical industry, 
including their research efforts, is by another editor, Marcia Angell, former 
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine.  See generally MARCIA 
ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004). 
 101. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical 
Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 
1542 (2000) (documenting ghostwriting); see also United States ex rel. 
McDermott v. Genentech, No. 05-147-P-C, 2006 WL 3741920, at *3 (D. Me. 
Dec. 14, 2006) (discussing alleged  ghostwriting by pharmaceutical firms). 
 102. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Expression of Concern Reaffirmed, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193, 1193 (2006); see also Claire Bombardier et al., 
Correspondence, Response to Expression of Concern Regarding VIGOR Study, 
354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1196, 1196–98 (2006) (addressing the concerns of 
Curfman et al.); Lancet Editors, Editorial, Vioxx: An Unequal Partnership 
Between Safety and Efficacy, 364 LANCET 1287, 1288 (2004) (noting that “the 
real picture of cardiovascular risk has been apparent for some time and 
Merck’s vigorous defense of this drug in the past was clearly an error” and 
that “the Vioxx story is one of blindly aggressive marketing by Merck mixed 
with repeated episodes of complacency by drug regulators”); Richard Horton, 
Comment, Vioxx, The Implosion of Merck, and Aftershocks at the FDA, 364 
LANCET 1995, 1995–96 (2004). 
 103. See William M. Sage, Some Principles Require Principals: Why 
Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive Problems in Biomedical 
Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413, 1413–18 (2007) (arguing that “conflicts of 
interest” as a term is used too broadly and thwarts effective responses to 
incentives in research).  Conflicts of interests in research raise other issues, of 
course, including concerns over the protection of human subjects either 
because of misunderstandings or miscommunication of the purpose of the 
intervention or because of enrollment pressures.  See, e.g., Kevin W. Williams, 
Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials 
Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 68–69 
(2004). 
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patients would be better off without it.104  Furthermore, 
conflicts-of-interest regulation has limited usefulness as a tool 
for controlling for the impact of funding on the quality of 
clinical research. 
JAMA’s own response to the credibility crisis illustrates 
some of the limitations of the conflicts-of-interest response to 
perceived deficiencies in clinical research.  JAMA, like other 
medical journals,105 has instituted several policies to handle 
financial conflicts of interest related to articles submitted for 
publication.106  Among those, the requirement of author 
disclosure of financial interests and the requirement of 
independent data analysis for industry-supported studies 
suggest that current responses to financial conflicts of interest 
in clinical research are imperfect at best.107 
C. DISCLOSURE AND SKEPTICISM 
JAMA requires that authors disclose financial conflicts of 
interest related to the research reported in their submitted 
article.  JAMA began requesting disclosure by authors in 
 104. Brennan et al., supra note 30, at 252–53; DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 
996. 
 105. JAMA is a member of the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors (ICMJE), which has established conflict-of-interest policies that each 
member journal agrees to enforce.  Members of ICMJE include the New 
England Journal of Medicine, The Lancet, Annals of Internal Medicine, and 
others.  See ICMJE—Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to 
Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication, 
http://www.icmje.org (last visited Oct. 20, 2007). 
 106. For example, journal members of the ICMJE, including JAMA, in 
response to episodes of suppression of the results of studies, require that 
clinical trials be posted in a “public trials registry” as a condition of 
submission for publication.  Id.  One of the most highly publicized instances of 
alleged suppression involved study results indicating that the use of Paxil by 
adolescents suffering from depression may increase suicide rates for that 
population.  Eliot Spitzer, the former Attorney General of New York, sued 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) for its actions in regard to Paxil.  As part of the 
settlement, GSK agreed to establish a clinical trials registry on which it would 
post summaries of all clinical studies within ten months of the completion of 
the study.  At the same time, several other pharmaceutical companies 
established similar sites.  GSK Will Disclose Clinical Trial Data, Settles Case 
Brought by New York AG, 13 HEALTH L. REP. 1290, 1290 (2004).  In a 
settlement just a few days later, Forest Laboratories agreed to establish a 
registry on which it would list its ongoing clinical trials as well as the results 
of completed trials.  Forest Laboratories to Create Registry Summarizing 
Clinical Trials of its Products, 13 HEALTH L. REP. 1325, 1325 (2004). 
 107. See DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997. 
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1985;108 made disclosure mandatory in 1989;109 began 
publishing author disclosures in 1990;110 and strengthened its 
disclosure requirements in 2006,111 in response to concerns 
about author non-compliance with the Journal’s prior 
disclosure requirements.112  The purpose of publishing financial 
relationship disclosures, according to the Journal’s editor-in-
chief, is “so that readers can interpret the article in light of that 
information.”113  It is not clear exactly how the reader, even the 
medically-trained reader, is to take the disclosed conflict into 
account in evaluating whether the article should influence 
prescribing decisions, however. 
A quick look at recent issues of JAMA suggests the 
complexity of accounting for a disclosed relationship when 
evaluating an article as a source of information to incorporate 
in practice.  In a selection of recent JAMA issues,114 at least 
one of the authors for approximately one-third (thirty-five of 
one-hundred-six) of articles categorized by the Journal as 
“Original Contributions” (thirty-one of ninety) or “Reviews” 
(four of sixteen) disclosed financial relationships.115  Four of the 
thirty-five instances of reported relevant financial relationships 
were by authors of Reviews, meta-analyses of previously 
published studies that are among the most influential articles 
in medical journals.116  Because “the essence of reviews and 
 108. Elizabeth Knoll & George D. Lundberg, Editorial, New Instructions for 
JAMA Authors, 254 JAMA 97, 97 (1985). 
 109. George D. Lundberg & Annette Flanagin, Editorial, New 
Requirements for Authors, 262 JAMA 2003, 2003 (1989). 
 110. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997. 
 111. Annette Flanagin, Editorial, Update on JAMA’s Conflict of Interest 
Policy, 296 JAMA 220, 220 (2006). 
 112. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997 (“[T]here simply is no way to 
guarantee that all financial relationships and arrangements of all authors are 
disclosed.”). 
 113. Id. at 997. 
 114. The sample consisted of every fourth issue published between January 
5, 2005 and August 2, 2006 for a total of twenty issues. 
 115. It is likely, however, that more authors than actually disclosed such 
relationships had financial dealings with sponsors that would be covered by 
the JAMA disclosure requirement.   
 116. In one study, 73% of physician respondents reported that they used 
review articles as an information source.  McAlister et al., supra note 33, at 
236.  These review articles may be attractive to physicians because they 
evaluate a number of articles.  In the same survey, only 34% of respondent 
physicians believed that they were able to evaluate the methodology of a study 
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editorials is selection and interpretation of the literature,” the 
New England Journal of Medicine refuses to publish reviews by 
authors who have a “significant” financial interest relevant to 
the subject matter of the review, although it had to relax its 
prohibition in 2002 because of its inability to secure reviews of 
drug therapies under the former
Five of the twelve Reviews in JAMA for which no author 
made a financial disclosure involved review of an issue for 
which there is no apparent pharmaceutical connection in 
treatment or diagnosis, while seven Reviews addressed issues 
with obvious implication for drug therapies or diagnosis.  All 
four of the Reviews written by authors who disclosed financial 
relationships, however, reviewed pharmaceutical interventions.  
Thus, of the seven Reviews with apparent pharmaceutical 
subject matter, more than half were written by authors with 
disclosable financial relationships.  These numbers may 
actually under-report the proportion of JAMA articles written 
by authors with relevant financial interests as there have been 
some reports of authors failing to disclose required 
information.118 
In an editorial published in JAMA describing the 
implementation of its disclosure policy, the editor-in-chief 
argued that all articles in JAMA have passed “rigorous peer 
review and careful editorial evaluation.”119  She went on to 
observe that that the failure of authors of several articles 
published by JAMA to disclose required information in early 
2006 “does not automatically translate to the article being 
flawed.”120  Still, “[f]or disclosure to be effective, the recipient of 
advice must understand how the conflict of interest has 
influenced the advisor and must be able to correct for that 
biasing influence.”121 
on their own and only 46% felt capable of doing a literature search.  Id. 
 117. Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, Editorial, Financial 
Associations of Authors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1901, 1901 (2002) (observing 
that the Journal had been able to secure only one review article on novel drug 
therapy over the course of two years under its former prohibition of any 
financial interest on the part of review authors). 
 118. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 997. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Daylian Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2005); see supra notes 
32 and 34. 
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So, how should the practicing physician or practice 
guidelines development panel take the disclosed financial 
support into account and “correct for that biasing influence”?  If 
JAMA publishes an article after applying its “rigorous” peer 
review process with the reviewers aware of the relevant 
financial interests, what more would the individual practicing 
physician be able to bring to the critique of the research?  If the 
practicing physician is simply to be “skeptical,” the advice 
confirms the pattern of skepticism about scientific journals 
discussed earlier.122 If that pattern of skepticism is to be 
encouraged, then what should the physician rely on in deciding 
to prescribe medications off-label?  Experience?  Intuition?  
Peer opinion leaders?  Enlarging the scope just a bit, how 
should consensus or practice guideline panels treat the one-
third of JAMA articles that are written by authors with 
financial self-interest?  These articles can hardly be eliminated 
from consideration because they are likely to be the only source 
of peer-reviewed data and may in fact be valid. 
Disclosure does not itself remedy concerns with the quality 
of clinical information.  Disclosure of conflicts of interest has 
not produced the desired response in the clinical context.  The 
process of disclosing financial conflicts of interest may 
encourage the physician to grant him or herself a “moral 
license” to behave differently after making disclosure.123  In 
addition, disclosure of conflicts of interest by the doctor in a 
therapeutic relationship may actually increase the patient’s 
trust level rather than putting them on guard.124  The doctor-
reader may behave differently than patients in this regard, 
however, because doctors tend to believe that other physicians 
may be influenced by their financial interests even while they 
believe they themselves are not.125 
D. BLESSED BY ACADEMIA 
In an additional response to financial conflicts of interest 
in research, JAMA has established a special rule for 
independent statistical analysis for industry-sponsored studies.  
 122. See generally sources cited supra notes 32 and 34. 
 123. Cain et al., supra note 121, at 7. 
 124. Id. at 5–6. 
 125. Jason Dana, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians From 
Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 254 (2003). 
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In 2005, JAMA began requiring that the authors of industry-
sponsored studies in which data analysis was done “only by 
statisticians employed by the company sponsoring the 
research” submit an “independent analysis of the data . . . 
conducted by statisticians at an academic institution, such as a 
medical school, academic medical center, or government 
research institute” as a condition of consideration for 
publication.126  The preference for biostatisticians working at 
an “academic institution” assumes that where the evaluation is 
conducted makes a difference.  Furthermore, JAMA does not 
require independent data analysis of studies conducted and 
analyzed in academic institutions working under contract (such 
as through a research grant) with a for-profit industry 
sponsor.127  By implication, industry sponsorship is less 
dangerous when the academy is industry’s partner. 
In fact, a great deal of clinical research has moved out of 
the academic medical centers (AMCs) and into contract 
research organizations (CROs)128 and private physician offices.  
Although estimates of the magnitude of the shift from AMCs to 
private physician offices or CROs vary, all agree that there has 
been a landslide in that direction and that it continues to grow.  
At most, 40% of the funding of clinical trials is currently being 
placed with academic medical centers; and 60% is being placed 
with private practices,129 a three-fold increase in ten years.  
Fewer than half of researchers work in academic medical 
 126. Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Reporting Conflicts of Interest, Financial 
Aspects of Research, and Role of Sponsors in Funded Studies, 294 JAMA 110, 
111 (2005). 
 127. See id. 
 128. Contract Research Organizations are typically independent, for-profit 
companies that provide research services under contract with entities 
including pharmaceutical companies, the government and other groups 
engaged in clinical research.  The CROs conduct basic research and clinical 
trials and also provide other services, including data and safety monitoring 
services, for researchers.  CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND 
REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 78 (2005).  CRO services 
may also include regulatory compliance support, quality control, and support 
for marketing.  Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical Research, 
19 HEALTH AFF. 129, 137–38 (2000).  CROs also contract with site 
management service providers to assist doctors in private practice in 
recruiting patients for research protocols.  K. Morin et al., Managing Conflicts 
of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 79 (2002). 
 129. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 78; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 128, 
at 77. 
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centers, representing an 80% decrease over ten years.130  The 
number of physicians in private practice engaged in protocols 
tripled to nearly 12,000 between 1990 and 1995.131  Estimates 
of CRO participation in pharmaceutical research suggest an 
annual growth rate of approximately 20% between 1995 and 
2000.132 
Research has become a profit center for the physician in 
private practice.133  The sponsor typically pays the doctor a fee 
of between $2000 and $5000 per patient enrolled, sometimes 
requiring little beyond the collection of minimal data.134  The 
NIH generally pays somewhat lower enrollment fees for 
research in AMCs.135  According to a study published in 2000, 
doctors in private practice who engage in industry-funded 
studies also tend to receive additional compensation from 
sponsors.136 
This trend of moving clinical trials from academic medical 
centers to private practices will likely continue due to the 
attendant advantages.  Post-marketing clinical trials require 
very large numbers of patients.  Researchers may capture these 
numbers more quickly by paying private physicians to recruit 
their own patients rather than by paying an academic 
researcher to recruit individuals from the general population or 
from teaching hospitals.137  Practicing physician researchers 
 130. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 78; see Jason E. Klein & Alan R. 
Fleischmann, The Private Practicing Physician Investigator: Ethical 
Implications of Clinical Research in the Office Setting, 32 HASTINGS CTR. 
REPT. 22, 22 (2002). 
 131. Mark Hovde & Robert Seskin, Selecting U.S. Clinical Investigators, 
APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALS 34, 36 (1997). 
 132. Rettig, supra note 128, at 134. 
 133. Payment for enrollment of patients in clinical trials can substantially 
exceed the amounts paid by Medicare or third-party payers for treating those 
patients.  Morin et al., supra note 128, at 81; see also Deborah Borfitz, Can 
“Phase IV” Trials Work for You?, 80 MED. ECON. 58, 58 (2003), available at 
http://www.memag.com/memag/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=111425 (describing 
benefits and obligations for research in private practice). 
 134. Morin et al., supra note 128, at 81. 
 135. NIH studies typically pay approximately $1,000 per enrollee.  Id. 
 136. Physicians engaging in such studies may also be paid consulting fees 
for giving a presentation, receive an educational stipend, or receive authorship 
on a journal article reporting the results from the research. Office of Inspector 
General, supra note 9, at 16. 
 137. See id. at 14–15; see also Financial Relationships and Interests in 
Research Involving Human Subjects: Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 
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and contract research organizations may be able to complete 
clinical trials more quickly than an AMC because universities 
often have additional administrative requirements.138  In 
addition, clinical research at physicians’ offices may provide 
better models for medical decision making due to the varying 
practice settings, patient backgrounds, and practitioner skill 
levels available in that environment.139  Finally, as discussed 
in Part III of this article, funding post-approval studies in 
private medical offices may serve other non-research marketing 
interests for the pharmaceutical firms as well.140 
The JAMA policy requiring university or government 
analyses of data implies that the AMC provides a greater 
defense against industry behavior that undermines the 
reliability of clinical studies.141  The policy implies that the 
interests of the academic clinician researcher and the academic 
medical center will militate against acceptance of agreements 
allowing the sponsor to control publication of results; will more 
likely demand valid research design; and will be more likely to 
produce accurate data and reliable statistical analyses and 
interpretation. The assumption that academic researchers 
would be particularly sensitive to, and avoid, financial conflicts 
of interest is challenged by the fact that compliance with 
JAMA’s relatively benign disclosure requirements has proven 
spotty among academic researchers at very well-respected 
research universities.142  Beyond questions of character or 
understanding143 that might lie beneath these individual 
69 Fed. Reg. 26,393, 26,394 (May 12, 2004). 
 138. Susanne Rust & Cary Spivak, Drug-testing Industry Turns to Private 
Sector, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 30, 2007, at A17; see Kevin Williams, 
Managing Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials 
Conducted in the Private Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 62–63 
(2004) (discussing the perceived advantages of conducting clinical trials in 
private physician offices). 
 139. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1627; see supra note 65 and infra text 
accompanying notes 213–215. 
 140. See supra note 65 and infra text accompanying notes 213–215. 
 141. See generally Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in 
Biomedical Research: IRB Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the 
Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379 (2000). 
 142. DeAngelis, supra note 91, at 996; see also Goldner, supra note 141, at 
384 (detailing the additional pressures in the academic environment that 
produce conflicts of interest). 
 143. See, e.g., David Henry et al., Ties That Bind: Multiple Relationships 
Between Clinical Researchers and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 165 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 2493, 2495 (2005) (noting studies demonstrating that 
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instances of noncompliance, contemporary circumstances 
challenge the assumed singularity of interests in the academic 
research endeavor. 
Elite research universities and their medical centers rely 
primarily on NIH funding to support their research efforts.  
Even in these institutions, however, industry-funded research 
enhances the discretionary budget by providing a margin that 
remains in the control of the department or the researcher 
rather than the university budget office.144  AMCs other than 
the research elite may be losing the competition for the now 
shrinking NIH research dollar and hence increasingly rely on 
pharmaceutical research contracts to fill the gap.145  The Bayh-
Dole Act of 1980146 significantly altered the interests of 
academic researchers and universities by introducing an 
incentive for entrepreneurship. 
The Bayh-Doyle Act expedited the commercialization of 
inventions by giving research institutions ownership interests 
physicians and researchers believe themselves to be “impervious to industry 
influence” despite the literature indicating that gifts trigger an “unconscious 
and unintentional” sense of obligation). 
 144. See Goldner, supra note 141, at 384 (describing budgeting and 
compensation processes).  A 1996 study of the fifty universities receiving the 
highest level of NIH funding reported that 28% of their faculty received 
industry funding for research.  David Blumenthal et al., Participation of Life-
Science Faculty in Research Relationships with Industry, 335 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1734, 1734 (1996).  More recent data reports that industry funds for 
research in universities increased by 875% between 1980 and 2000.  Trudo 
Lemmens, Leopards in the Temple: Restoring Scientific Integrity to the 
Commercialized Research Scene, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 641, 645 (2004) (citing 
SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF 
PROFIT CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? 79–81 (2003)).  Elite universities 
have experienced significant increases.  For example, industry funding 
contributes 31% of the overall budget at Duke University.  The University of 
Texas reported an increase in private funding of 735%, and the University of 
California at San Francisco, 491%.  Id. 
 145. U.S. universities are not alone in relying on industry funding.  
Between 2002 and 2004, for example, industry funding to McMaster 
University in Canada reportedly quadrupled from $34 million to nearly $129 
million.  Steve Buist et al., Risks, Rewards & Research; Blind Faith—Part 1 of 
5, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, June 25, 2005, at A01.  In addition, 15.5% of the 
full-time faculty had “financial connections” to pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology firms.  Id.  At the same time, pharmaceutical funding for 
research at the University of Toronto, one of the elite research universities in 
Canada, declined to less than 10% of the University’s total research funding.  
Id. 
 146. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). 
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in the fruits of their government-funded research.147  In a 2000 
study, 124 of 183 institutions that were members of the 
Association of University Technology Managers reported that 
they held equity interests in businesses engaged in research at 
the university.148 Start-up companies, like those stimulated by 
Bayh-Dole and often jointly owned by research faculty and 
their university-employers, have been associated with delays in 
publication of study results and resistance to sharing 
results,149 mirroring the issues concerning sponsor control of 
research discussed above.  At a minimum, then, rules 
applicable to “industry” should not be restricted only to large, 
for-profit pharmaceutical firms, but should also consider the 
smaller start-ups owned by research faculty and the 
universities themselves.  Moreover, the narrow target of the 
JAMA policy exemplifies another attempt to make the 
challenge to clinical research more manageable by drawing 
boundaries that lack a
E. THE PRACTICE GAP 
Industry influence is not the only issue affecting the utility 
of clinical trials for prescribing decisions.  Critics of the current 
state of clinical research focus on faults in the design of studies 
that have little or nothing to do with industry sponsorship and 
conflicts of interest.  For example, current studies of health 
outcomes in clinical trials frequently suffer from two forms of 
design flaws.  First, many clinical studies rely on observation 
and self-reporting as the primary tool for evaluating 
effectiveness.150  Although these tools are unavoidable in some 
 147. See generally Clovia Hamilton, University Technology Transfer and 
Economic Development: Proposed Cooperative Economic Development Under 
the Bayh-Dole Act, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 397 (2003); Gary Pulsinelli, Share 
and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under 
the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393 (2006). 
 148. AUTM, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY, FY 1999: SURVEY SUMMARY 17 
(Lori Pressman ed., 2000), available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/ 
Surveys/99AUTMLicSurveyPublic.pdf. 
 149. David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic 
Life Science: Evidence from a National Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224, 
1227 (1997); Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: 
Evidence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473, 479 (2002); Joel Lexchin, 
The Secret Things Belong Unto the Lord Our God: Secrecy in the 
Pharmaceutical Arena, 26 Med. & L. 417, 421 (2007) (reviewing data on 
suppression of research results in academia). 
 150. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1627. 
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circumstances they tend to suffer from bias.151  Second, most 
clinical trials are not designed with the clinical decision-
making process in mind.  In order to remedy this latter 
problem, some have recommended encouraging “pragmatic” or 
“practical” clinical trials (PCTs).  PCTs are targeted toward 
producing information needed for clinical decision making.152  
These studies compare clinically relevant interventions, feature 
a diverse population of study participants, recruit practitioners 
from a variety of settings, and collect data on a broad range of 
health outcomes.153  PCTs should also include patients from 
high-risk populations and must use diagnostic indicators that 
are commonly used in practice, which may be less definitive 
than other more sophisticated but less available diagnostic 
tools.154  Researchers should also select patients who replicate 
the typical clinical population in terms of history of medication 
and of preexisting medical conditions, characteristics that are 
typically excluded in clinical trials.155  In addition, the studies 
should compare effectiveness, cost, and safety among available 
drugs and between medications and non-pharmaceutical 
therapies.156  Finally, clinical trials with relevancy for clinical 
decision making should account for variations in the quality of 
physician skills, since this may have a substantial impact on 
 151. See, e.g., Ellen T. Chang et al., Reliability of Self-Reported Family 
History of Cancer in a Large Case-Control Study of Lymphoma, 98 J. NAT’L 
CANCER INST. 61, 61 (2006) (concluding that recall bias may produce biased 
results in studies of familial cancer risk), available at http://jnci. 
oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/98/1/61; Y. Fukuoka et al., Systematic Bias 
in Self-Reported Annual Household Incomes Among Unpartnered Elderly 
Cardiac Patients, 20 APPLIED NURSING RES. 205, 205 (2007) (concluding that 
there is “potential systematic bias regarding self-reporting of annual 
household income” with implications for studies of the impact of income). 
 152. Martin Roland & David J. Torgerson, What are Pragmatic Trials?, 316 
BRIT. MED. J. 285, 285 (1998); Daniel Schwartz & Joseph Lellouch, 
Explanatory and Pragmatic Attitudes in Therapeutic Trials, 20 J. CHRONIC 
DISEASE 637, 639 (1967). 
 153. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1626. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Margaret A. Handley et al., Navigating the Terrain Between Research 
and Practice: A Collaborative Research Network (CRN) Case Study in Diabetes 
Research, 19 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED. 85, 89 (2006), available at http:// www. 
jabfm.org/cgi/content/full/19/1/85 (noting need to test “whether research 
findings from homogenous populations . . . are generalizable to more diverse 
ones such as those encountered in ‘real world’ practices”); Office of Inspector 
General, supra note 9, at 14. 
 156. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1626. 
JOHNSON S. POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT? FALSE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF FALSE 
CLAIMS REGARDING OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;9(1):61-124.  
2008] POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT 101 
                                                          
the effectiveness of a therapy.157   
Removing or regulating conflicts of interest in research will 
not stimulate more clinically-useful design.  Furthermore, off-
label prescribing and other treatment decisions confront 
serious quantity and timeliness issues in clinical knowledge.  
Several experts, for example, have noted that current clinical 
research endeavors are not producing “an adequate supply of 
information to meet the needs of clinicians and health policy 
decision makers.”158  The lack of a clinically focused research 
agenda reduces the effectiveness of practice guidelines, which 
lack clear and specific recommendations,159 and hampers 
payers attempting to make scientifically grounded coverage 
decisions with serious implications for substantive controls on 
off-label prescribing.160  One cannot explain this insufficiency 
by financial conflicts of interest.  In fact, restrictions on 
industry funding of research are likely to diminish the 
production of necessary clinical knowledge.161 
Widespread concern for the credibility and reliability of 
clinical research in pharmaceuticals is apparent, but the 
solution is not.  The conflict-of-interest framework, especially to 
the extent that it relies on disclosure, does not effectively 
respond to the issue of the quality of particular articles.  It 
merely raises a nonspecific warning flag on the data that is 
often countered by the peer-review “seal of approval” for 
published studies.  Counterintuitively, the warning flag may 
actually decrease sensitivity to conflicts of interest by creating 
a false impression of trustworthiness, as such disclosures have 
in the clinical setting,162 or conversely by reducing such 
disclosures to background chatter because of the pervasiveness 
of industry support for clinical trials.  Efforts to assure that 
pharmaceutical firms do not cook the data or misinterpret the 
results of a trial are completely justifiable.  Exhorting them to 
voluntarily select and fund studies that do not contribute to or 
that may undermine their competitive position is probably 
futile, except in situations where harm to patient safety is at 
 157. See id. at 1627. 
 158. Id. at 1625 (citations omitted); see also Soumerai, supra note 28, at 
142 (referencing the gap in timeliness and noting that “drug cost containment 
policy making often cannot wait for good evidence”). 
 159. Tunis et al., supra note 41, at 1625. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 72–81, 104. 
 162. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text. 
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issue and legal, reputational, and even moral concerns are 
more acute.  Other options for increasing the volume of post-
approval clinical research beyond that required for safety 
surveillance typically require accounting for the cost of such 
research somewhere.163 
Although the conflicts-of-interest tool addresses one aspect 
of imperfection in prescribing information, it does so only 
roughly.  In addition, it does not contribute to stimulating the 
conduct of Phase IV trials, and may instead actually depress 
the development of post-marketing research.  Finally, the 
conflicts-of-interest approach does not provide a reliable 
method for distinguishing between appropriate and 
inappropriate prescribing. 
PART III: FALSE CLAIMS ACT LITIGATION AND OFF-
LABEL PRESCRIBING 
Over the past three years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
has enjoyed tremendous success in pursuing False Claims Act 
actions against pharmaceutical firms relating to off-label 
prescribing and post-approval relationships with prescribing 
physicians.164  The $430 million settlement and guilty plea by 
the manufacturer of a single drug, Neurontin, ranks as one of 
the most significant DOJ victories. 
The Neurontin-style litigation, whether hailed as “the best 
hope for short-term reform”165 or condemned as “inefficient” 
and “overly-aggressive,”166 is most often viewed as a 
 163. See, e.g., Daniel Carpenter, A Proposal for Financing Postmarketing 
Drug Safety Studies by Augmenting FDA User Fees, HEALTH AFF., Web 
Exclusive, Oct. 18, 2005.  The FDAAA of 2007 increased user fees. Pub. L. No. 
110-85 § 302, 121 Stat. 823 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.); see also discussion of the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, 
supra note 24–26, which uses extended market exclusivity to compensate 
firms for testing approved drugs in post-approval clinical trials with children. 
 164. See supra, note 11; see also Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral 
Hazard Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: The Case of 
Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40 MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 283–84 (2007) (describing 
magnitude of government litigation efforts in this context). 
 165. David J. Rothman, Strong Medicine, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 27, 2004, 
at 36. 
 166. Christopher D. Zalesky, Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: 
Balancing Public Health and Law Enforcement Interests; Moving Beyond 
Regulation Through Litigation, 39 J. HEALTH L. 235, 264 (2006); see also 
Ralph Hall & Robert Berlin, When You Have a Hammer, Everything Looks 
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dramatization of financial conflicts of interest in research and 
clinical decision making fueled by pharmaceutical industry 
practices relating to prescribing.167  It certainly is that.  
Although never formally resolved by verdict or final 
judgment,168 the evidence strongly suggests that Parke-
Davis,169 the defendant manufacturer of Neurontin, had used 
both educational and research efforts as vehicles to market the 
drug aggressively for off-label uses.170 
Other insights emerge, however, when the course of the 
litigation and settlement are set parallel to contemporaneous 
and subsequent patterns of off-label prescribing for Neurontin.  
Viewed in that context, the difficulties that arise in evaluating 
whether a particular off-label prescription is itself actually a 
“false claim” or in some other fashion inappropriate come into a 
Like a Nail: Misapplication of the False Claims Act to Off-Label Promotion, 61 
FOOD DRUG L.J. 653, 653 (2006). 
 167. See The Indictment of Pharma Industry Marketing Practices, 
INTERNAL MED. ALERT, Oct. 15, 2006; Valerie Jablow, Lawsuits Fault Off-
Label Use of Neurontin in Suicide Cases, TRIAL, NOV. 2004 at 12, 12–14. 
 168. It is unlikely that pharmaceutical defendants in fraud and abuse 
prosecutions will proceed to trial for a final judgment of violation of the 
statutes, as a 1996 federal statute provides that a Medicare or Medicaid 
provider found guilty of such violations must be excluded from those 
programs. Thomas S. Crane et al., Congress Strengthens Anti-Fraud and 
Abuse Juggernaut, 5 HEALTH L. REP. 37, 37 (Sept. 19, 1996); Edward P. 
Lansdale, Used As Directed?  How Prosecutors are Expanding the False Claims 
Act to Police Pharmaceutical Off-Label Marketing, 41 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159 
(2006).  In fact, in the Neurontin settlement, Parke-Davis pled guilty of 
violations only for behavior prior to 1996, apparently to avoid exclusion from 
these reimbursement programs. 
 169. Parke-Davis was the named defendant at the initiation of this 
litigation. This article refers to the defendant firm as Parke-Davis even though 
Warner-Lambert was the signatory for the settlement.  Parke-Davis was a 
division of Warner-Lambert at that time.  Warner Lambert merged with Pfizer 
in 2000.  Pfizer agreed to a corporate compliance program for Warner-Lambert 
as part of the 2004 settlement agreement.  For a lineage of the relationship 
among these firms, see http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/2000_present.jsp. 
 170. Michael A. Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of 
Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 284, 285–88 (2006) (analyzing internal Parke-Davis 
documents concerning activities relating to prescribing of Neurontin and 
concluding that continuing medical education and research were used to 
promote Neurontin but noting that the documents were supplied by the 
relator’s attorneys).  Interestingly, three of the authors of that article served 
as unpaid expert witnesses in the litigation, a fact that is acknowledged within 
the text of the article, but is not revealed in the head material for the article. 
Phil Kabler, Marketing Predated Firm’s Purchase, Pfizer Says, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Aug. 23, 2006, at 3C. 
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sharper focus.  Furthermore, the disreputable connotation of 
“off-label” as non-scientific or fraudulent is challenged by the 
subsequent FDA approval of Neurontin for particular 
indications that had become quite popular while in their “off-
label” stage and were, in fact, listed among the uses for which 
prescriptions were false claims.171  The discussion of the case, 
thus, highlights the deficiencies in current forms of clinical 
research,172 both in making prescribing decisions and in 
regulating those decisions.  The case illustrates quite sharply 
the importance of appreciating the issue of off-label prescribing 
as more than simply an issue of inappropriate financial 
relationships in medicine and the challenge of regulating off-
label prescribing in light of medical ways of knowing and 
learning.   
Government regulation of pharmaceutical industry 
activities in post-approval marketing and funding research has 
been weak.173  Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
 171. See infra text accompanying note 241; see Lansdale, supra note 168, at 
159. 
 172. See discussion in Part III. 
 173. For a comprehensive overview of laws governing post-approval 
marketing of off-label uses for approved drugs, see Stephanie Greene, False 
Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 41 (2005).  Private efforts to set boundaries on appropriate 
behavior in relationships between industry and researchers/prescribers have 
been increasing.  In addition to the journal policies discussed earlier, 
professional medical societies, including the AMA, and the drug industry trade 
association (PhRMA), have issued guidelines for relationships between 
prescribers and the companies.  AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS E-8.06: 
PRESCRIBING AND DISPENSING DRUGS AND DEVICES (2002), available at http:// 
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/8483.html; CODE ON INTERACTIONS 
WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (PhRMA 2004), available at http:// www. 
phrma.org/files/PhRMA%20Code.pdf; see also AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY 
PHYSICIANS, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE TIES AFFECTING FORMULARY 
CHOICES AND DRUG SUBSTITUTION (1998, revised 2004),  available at http:// 
www.aafp.org/online/en/home/policy/policies/d/drugs.html.  The Office of 
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services has 
recommended compliance with the private PhRMA guidelines “as a good 
starting point for compliance purposes.”  67 Fed. Reg. 62,057, 62,063 (Oct. 3, 
2002).  A few private universities also have established their own policies 
restricting or prohibiting particular marketing and educational activities on 
the part of pharmaceutical firms.  Stanford University Medical Center, for 
example, enacted a new policy on October 1, 2006, which prohibits physicians 
from accepting industry gifts, including drug samples, anywhere on the 
medical center campus or at off-site clinical facilities.  The policy further bars 
“pharmaceutical, bio-device and related industry representatives from patient 
care areas and medical school facilities except for in-service training on 
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restrict,174 but do not entirely prohibit, post-approval 
marketing of approved drugs for off-label uses.  In addition, 
court decisions concerning the constitutional boundaries on the 
authority of the agency to confine commercial speech have 
hampered aggressive enforcement of these provisions.175  
Furthermore, the FDA largely relies on voluntary compliance 
with its marketing restrictions and has devoted only limited 
resources to post-approval marketing surveillance.176  Some 
have argued that the FDA’s relative inactivity in this arena is 
not due to regulatory philosophy or to limitations in resources 
but rather is due to the influence of pharmaceutical 
interests.177  Although some states have enacted statutes to 
address issues in the marketing of drugs, these efforts are 
relatively new and undeveloped and rely primarily on 
disclosure mechanisms.178 
Federal agencies also regulate post-approval 
pharmaceutical research efforts through the mechanisms that 
govern research with human subjects generally.179  These 
devices and equipment and by appointment only, as well as allowing industry 
support of educational activities only under well-regulated conditions.” New 
Stanford Medical Center Policy Limits Drug Company Access and Gifts, MED. 
DEVICES (Oct. 15, 2006), available at http://med.stanford.edu/news_releases/. 
 174. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2000); 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000 & Supp. IV 
2005). 
 175. See Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51 
(D.D.C. 1998).  The Washington Legal Foundation has established a project 
called “FDA/DDMAC Watch” through which it challenges FDA interventions 
in post-approval marketing.  See http://www.wlf.org/Resources/DDMAC/ (last 
visited 9/28/06); see Nicole Endejann, Is the FDA’s Nose Growing?: The FDA 
Does Not “Exaggerate Its Overall Place in the Universe” When Regulating 
Speech Incident to “Off-Label” Prescription Drug Labeling and Advertising, 35 
AKRON L. REV. 491, 505 (2002); David M. Fritch, Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil, 
Harm the Patient?  Why the FDA Needs to Seek More, Rather Than Less, 
Speech From Drug Manufacturers on Off-Label Drug Treatments, 9 MICH. ST. 
U. J. MED. & L. 315, 334 (2005). 
 176. See Zalesky, supra note 166, at 257 (describing the FDA’s policy of 
voluntary compliance and limited staff devoted to all advertising and 
marketing issues of approved drugs). 
 177. David Rothman notes that the OIG, in contrast to the FDA, seems to 
be “oddly . . . immune to political pressure as they try to rein in drug 
companies.”  Rothman, supra note 165, at 36. 
 178. See Zalensky, supra note 166, at 253; see, e.g., D.C. CODE § 48-833.01 
(2004). 
 179. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.101–.409 (regulating research funded by the 
Department of Health and Human Services); 21 C.F.R. § 50.1–50.56 
(regulating research funded by the FDA or which will be submitted to the FDA 
in relation to agency action).  These requirements have a broader reach than 
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regulations, often called the “Common Rule” because they have 
been promulgated in similar form by several federal agencies to 
govern private and public research that arises in the scope of 
their work, focus on protecting the individuals who participate 
as subjects in research protocols.180  These regulations 
generally delegate enforcement of the protective standards to 
the private research organization or university itself with only 
a second front of government oversight that has varied over 
time in its activity level.  Several of the agencies, including the 
FDA, that share this “Common Rule” have issued guidance or 
regulations concerning financial relationships between 
researchers and sponsors, including sponsors of pharmaceutical 
research.181  Essentially, these conflicts-of-interest regulations 
rely on the same delegation to private research organizations 
that characterizes the “Common Rule” generally.  The conflicts-
of-interest guidance or regulations require that the research 
organization have a written policy; that researchers disclose 
conflicts of interest to the research organization; that the 
organization operate an internal review mechanism; and that 
the organization manage, reduce or eliminate conflicts of 
interest, as appropriate.182  Guidance on conflicts of interest in 
research from the Department of Health and Human Services 
is even more general, and consists mostly of questions and 
points that the institution might consider in implementing an 
internal conflict-of-interest policy, while the FDA provides for 
agency evaluation of financial interest disclosures that exceed 
indicated in the regulations themselves as research universities typically 
agree to apply the federal regulations to all research conducted within the 
university or by university employees.  COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 
107. 
 180. See COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 128, at 106. 
 181. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (FDA); 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (HHS).  Conflicts-
of-interest regulation is justified as an element of protecting the subjects of 
research for two reasons.  First, research with human subjects must provide 
benefits that outweigh the risks of the studies; and to the extent that conflicts 
of interest may compromise the validity or usefulness of the results, they may 
alter the risk-benefit calculus.  Second, conflicts of interest may lead to 
overaggressive enrollment of individuals with inattention to consent or 
exclusion criteria. 
 182. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2006); 68 Fed. Reg. 15,456-01 (Mar. 31, 2003); see, 
e.g., Harrington supra note 96, at 793; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: MOST FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED TO PROTECT AGAINST 
FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. 
SHELBY, U.S. SENATE 17 (2003). 
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statutory thresholds.183 
In contrast to the limitations imposed upon or adopted by 
the FDA in regulating industry-prescriber interactions, the 
DOJ and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the 
Department of Health and Human Services have adopted an 
aggressive litigation strategy to regulate industry post-
approval marketing and clinical research funding, especially as 
these relate to off-label prescribing.  In fact, the OIG has 
identified industry-prescriber relationships as a primary target 
for enforcement efforts.184  The DOJ and OIG wield an assault 
weapon in the form of civil and criminal enforcement of 
statutes designed to protect the government’s financial 
interests in public programs,185 such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, and to establish boundaries on post-approval 
marketing and funding of research by pharmaceutical firms.186  
This high-profile litigation strategy is currently the primary 
“regulatory” effort for off-label marketing, industry-funded 
clinical trials, and prescribing.  The Neurontin litigation 
discussed in this section is the most notable e
t. 
The FDA approved Neurontin (gabapentin) in 1994 for use 
as adjunctive therapy for epilepsy.187  Shortly after its 
approval, physicians were prescribing Neurontin as a 
 183. 42 C.F.R. § 50.604 (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (2007). FDA regulations 
require that applicants for FDA action submit either a certification that 
investigators of submitted studies do not have conflicts of interest or a 
disclosure statement that discloses the investigator’s financial interests that 
do exist.  For investigators disclosing such financial interests, the FDA 
evaluates the nature of the interests and the steps that have been taken to 
eliminate “bias created by a disclosable financial interest.” 
 184. Lansdale, supra note 168, at 180; Marc J. Scheineson and Shannon T. 
Klinger, Lessons From Expanded Government Enforcement Efforts Against 
Drug Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 1 (2005); Robert Brady et al., 
Pharmaceutical Companies Have Been Penalized for Pushing Their Products 
for Unapproved Uses, NAT’L L.J.,  Mar. 20, 2006 (detailing recent actions and 
settlements); see also supra note 11. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (2000) (anti-kickback statute); 31 U.S.C. § 
3729–33 (2000) (false claims act). 
 186. Although this article focuses on pharmaceuticals, similar issues have 
arisen in the promotion of medical devices.  See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Whistle-
Blower Suit Says Device Maker Generously Rewards Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
24, 2006, at C1; see also United States ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic, Inc., 403 
F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 187. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 45 
(D. Mass. 2001); see also Neurontin, in PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE 2462 
(2008). 
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monotherapy for epilepsy; for pain control for a large number of 
pain states, including post-herpetic neuropathy; for bipolar 
disorder; for attention deficit disorder; for ALS; for migraine; 
for restless leg syndrome; for sleep disorders; and for a variety 
of other uses.188  In fact, in 1995, one year after approval of 
Neurontin, 40% of the prescription
e for off-label indications.189 
The Neurontin litigation began when Dr. David Franklin, a 
medical liaison employed by Parke-Davis, filed a qui tam action 
in 1996.  In his lawsuit, Franklin alleged that Parke-Davis 
illegally incentivized physicians to write prescriptions for 
Neurontin which would be paid for by government medical 
payment programs, including Medicare, Medicaid and 
Veterans’ Administration programs.  Franklin argued, among 
other theories, that these prescriptions amounted to false 
claim
Defendant Parke-Davis filed a motion to dismiss Franklin’s 
claims on several grounds, but were largely unsuccessful in 
regard to claims relating to Neurontin.190 Parke-Davis argued 
that it had not filed a single claim for reimbursement from any 
governmental entity for prescriptions for Neurontin.  It argued 
 188. Lansdale, supra note 168, at 159. 
 189. Julie Schmit, Drugmaker Admitted Fraud, But Sales Flourish, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 17, 2004, at 1A.  Prescribing patterns for Neurontin during the 
litigation and after the settlement are described infra at text accompanying 
notes 225–229. 
 190. The court did dismiss the relator’s claims relating to Accupril, another 
drug produced by Parke-Davis for insufficient specificity in pleading. Franklin, 
147 F. Supp. 2d  at 50.  The court also dismissed the claims relating to 
violation of the anti-kickback statute. Id. at 54.  The court in a later opinion 
denied the relator’s motion to amend its pleadings on this particular claim, 
commenting that the relator’s new theory “may well be viable,” but that the 
delay in filing the motion to amend would prejudice the defendant.  United 
States ex rel. Franklin v. Pfizer, No. Civ. A. 96-11651, 2002  U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5761, at *4 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002).  The court granted the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss the relator’s count for false claims against the Veterans’ 
Administration for Neurontin prescriptions for lack of the required specificity 
in pleading, but denied the motion in relation to the Medicaid program.  
Franklin, 147 F.Supp.2d at 49–50.  The standards for specificity in pleading 
false claims actions of this sort may have heightened since this decision.  See, 
e.g., United States ex rel. Rost v. Pfizer, 466 F. Supp. 2d 6, 6 (D. Mass. 2006); 
see also United States ex rel. McDermott v. Genentech, 2006 WL 3741920 at 
*10–*12 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 2006). 
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physicians who had filed a claim, whether false or not.191  The 
doctors, according to Parke-Davis, were an “intervening force” 
and as such the necessary causal link between its own behavior 
and the false claims was missing.  According to the court, 
however, the doctors’ actions were foreseeable and were, in fact, 
the “intended consequence of the alleged scheme of fraud,” 
satisfying the requirement of causation.192 
Parke-Davis also argued that the False Claims Act could 
not be used to enforce the FDCA’s restrictions on promotion of 
approved drugs for off-label uses.  The court rejected this 
argument holding that violation of the anti-promotion 
provisions of the FDCA could be pursued under the False 
Claims Act if the violation of the FDCA “amounts to a material 
misrepresentation made to obtain a government benefit.”193  In 
the view of the court, the False Claims Act simply provided 
tools not available to the FDA, including civil money damages 
and private enforcement, for the enforcement of its restrictions 
on promotion of off-label uses.194 
The court contended with two central issues in applying 
false claims standards to Parke-Davis’s marketing efforts.  
First, while particular activities, such as discussing off-label 
uses without an initial physician inquiry, may formally violate 
the FDCA restrictions on marketing, can those communications 
properly be considered false claims unless the representations 
themselves are inaccurate or false?  Second, if the non-
approved indications for which the drug is marketed and 
prescribed are legitimate uses covered by the federal payment 
program, can they be false claims by virtue of their status as 
off-label or by the very fact that the firm had marketed these 
off-label uses to doctors? 
The court rejected the firm’s argument that off-label 
promotions, even when in violation of the FDCA, are not per se 
false statements within the meaning of the False Claims Act.  
The court rejected this argument, apparently relying on the 
relator’s claims in this particular case that the firm knowingly 
made false statements about the drug’s performance.195  The 
 191. This defense mimics the “learned intermediary” defense that has been 
available to pharmaceutical manufacturers in products liability suits. 
 192. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 53. 
 193. Id. at 51. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 52. 
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court in this opinion, however, stated that “[a] much closer 
question would be presented if the allegations involved only the 
unlawful—yet truthful—promotion of off-label uses . . . .”196 
In considering Parke-Davis’s later submission of a motion 
for summary judgment, however, the court revisited the issue 
of whether truthful information provided to physicians, but still 
an illegal promotion under the FDCA, could form the root of a 
false claim for prescribing.197  In this later unpublished 
opinion, the court concluded that defendant’s “non-fraudulent” 
promotion of Neurontin for off-label uses could, indeed, result 
in a false claim, but only if the Medicaid program did not cover 
the off-label uses at issue.198  Thus, there would be no false 
claim in the case of non-fraudulent promotional efforts that 
nonetheless violated the FDCA if the state Medicaid program 
covered the specific off-label prescriptions at issue.199 
According to the court’s opinion ruling on the firm’s motion 
to dismiss, Parke-Davis did not “dispute that an off-label 
prescription submitted for reimbursement by Medicaid is a 
false claim” in its motion to dismiss the qui tam action.200  
 196. Id. 
 197. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Pfizer, No. Civ. A. 96-11651, 2002 WL 
32128635, at *1 (D. Mass. Feb. 6, 2002). 
 198. Standards for coverage of prescriptions for off-label uses under 
Medicaid is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 252–257. 
 199. United States ex rel. Hess v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., No. 4; 05CV570, 
2006 WL 1064127, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2006), the court interprets the 
earlier Parke-Davis decision (147 F. Supp. 2d 30) as requiring that the 
information provided to doctors by the pharmaceutical firm concerning off-
label uses be “false information” in order to support a claim under the False 
Claims Act.  In Hess, the court dismissed the qui tam action against the 
defendant pharmaceutical firm because the information on the drug’s 
performance for the off-label use was “at most, immature, unreliable and 
misleading,” but not false.  Sanofi-Synthelabo, Inc., 2006 WL 1064127, at *9; 
see also United States ex rel. McDermott v. Genentech, 2006 WL 3741920 at 
*13 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 2006), dismissing relator’s qui tam False Claims Act claim 
relating to defendant’s promotion of off-label use of a biological product in part 
because the off-label use was reimbursable under Medicaid as that use was 
listed in one of the statutory compendia despite evidence that Genentech had 
pursued an aggressive marketing campaign that included allegations of 
ghostwriting of journal articles.  Hess and Genentech raise significant 
questions about the continued viability of qui tam actions relating to off-label 
promotion and certainly challenge the extensive reach of the standards used in 
Parke-Davis. They do not necessarily diminish the ability of the DOJ to get 
settlements for government claims regarding the same behaviors, however.  
See supra note 168. 
 200. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
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Even though Parke-Davis apparently did not dispute this 
proposition at that point in this litigation, it is not an accurate 
statement of the law.  It is well-established that Medicaid 
programs must cover off-label prescriptions under certain 
circumstances.201  Under the Medicaid program, prescription 
drugs are not covered if the drugs are prescribed “for a medical 
indication which is not a medically accepted indication.”202  An 
off-label or unapproved use, however, can be a “medically 
accepted indication” under the Medicaid statute if the off-label 
indication is included in one of the drug compendia listed in the 
federal statute.203  The court in its opinion denying the motion 
to dismiss states that none of the off-label uses at issue in the 
litigation were listed in any of the compendia during the time 
covered by the lawsuit.204  In its later opinion denying Parke-
Davis’s subsequent motion for summary judgment, however, 
the District Court further studied the question of whether the 
off-label uses of Neurontin were covered by Medicaid, at this 
point viewed by the court as a key question in whether a False 
Claims Act action for promotion of off-label uses would survive.  
In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued 
that forty-two state Medicaid programs covered “off-label, non-
compendium” prescriptions.205  While the court does not resolve 
whether states, in fact, have such latitude under the federal 
Medicaid statute, it concludes that at least eight states did not 
provide coverage for off-label, non-compendium prescriptions 
and that, at least as to those states, the False Claims Act 
claims could survive.  The court holds that the defendant’s 
argument thus goes to the amount of damages rather than to 
whether there are sufficient facts to support a claim.206 
 201. See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989); see infra text 
accompanying notes 245–250. 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(i)(10) (2000). 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(k)(6) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(B)(i) (2000). 
 204. Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 45.  Several of the off-label uses at issue 
in this case were also at issue in subsequent litigation relating to Medicaid 
coverage of Neurontin for off-label uses.  At least at the time of the latter case, 
the off-label indications were listed in some of the compendia.  See infra 
discussion at notes 246–249. 
 205. United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. Civ.A. 96-11651, 
2003 WL 22048255, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003).  Medicaid is a joint federal-
state program in which the federal statute and regulations provide a 
framework and minimums for coverage, allowing the states discretion on 
particular items. 
 206. Id. at *3. 
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The Department of Justice, which had monitored the 
Neurontin litigation from its filing by the private relator,207 
took an active role in the litigation after the District Court’s 
rulings denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion 
for summary judgment.208  Once it entered the case, the DOJ 
resurrected the allegation of false claims against the Veterans’ 
Administration,209 which had been dismissed by the trial judge.  
In addition, state attorneys general joined the action to file 
claims to recover the payments made by their states under the 
federal-state Medicaid program as well as claims under state 
consumer protection statutes.210 
The DOJ characterized Parke-Davis’s actions as “a 
widespread, coordinated national effort to implement an off-
label marketing plan.”211 As is often the case in qui tam 
litigation, internal communications provided the interpretive 
framework or narrative for the government’s suit.  First, a 
Parke-Davis marketing executive allegedly told the company’s 
medical liaisons that the FDA-approved use for Neurontin “is 
not where the money is.  I want you out there every day selling 
Neurontin” for off-label uses.212  In addition, an advertising 
firm working for the company produced a report entitled “1998 
Neurontin Tactics” which recommended that the company hold 
educational programs on the use of Neurontin for bi-polar 
disorder and other off-label uses of the drug.213 
 207. The district court notes that the suit was “in limbo” from its filing in 
1996 until 1999 “while the United States mulled over its option to intervene.” 
Franklin, 147 F. Supp. 2d. at 46. 
 208. In the 2003 proceeding, the federal government had filed only a 
“statement of interest” and had not yet intervened.  Franklin, 2003 WL 
22048255, at *1. 
 209. Department of Justice, supra note 5. 
 210. See, e.g., Rubel v. Pfizer, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  
Many of the states that received funds through the settlement agreement used 
a portion of the proceeds to support programs on physician prescribing 
practices.  See, e.g., Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General 
Myers Announces Prescription Drug Education Grants (Nov. 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2006/rel110106.shtml. 
 211. Department of Justice, supra note 5; see also Steinman et al., supra 
note 170 (concluding that Parke-Davis’s educational and research efforts were 
both part of the marketing plan for Neurontin). 
 212. Douglas McLeod, Lawsuits Mount Over Marketing of Epilepsy Drug, 
BUS. INS., June 14, 2004, at 3. 
 213. CLINE ET AL., 1998 NEURONTIN TACTICS 5932, available at 
http://dida.library.ucsf.edu/pdf/ida00a10. 
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Particular educational/marketing activities alleged by the 
DOJ to be illegal included encouraging sales representatives to 
pitch off-label use without a prior inquiry from the physician in 
violation of FDA standards for post-approval marketing.214  
The Department also challenged the company’s sponsorship of 
continuing medical education.  Parke-Davis sponsored 
“independent medical education” events, as do most 
pharmaceutical companies.  In this case, however, the DOJ 
alleged that Parke-Davis as sponsor selected the topics, 
speakers, and content of the programs and planted questions 
from the floor to assure that the drug would be showcased as it 
desired.  In addition, Parke-Davis conducted teleconferences in 
which physicians discussed their experience in prescribing 
Neurontin for off-label uses, with the company paying 
physician-speakers as well as paying doctors enrolled in the 
teleconference for their time.215  The DOJ further alleged that 
Parke-Davis representatives made misleading statements 
about the efficacy of the drug for particular purposes.216 
The evidence, as presented by the relator and the DOJ, 
also indicates that the firm’s funding of post-approval clinical 
research on off-label uses for Neurontin was a part of the 
marketing effort.  The government and the relator alleged that 
doctors participating in study protocols for Neurontin received 
substantial payments for enrolling their patients in the 
protocol while having minimal obligations for data collection or 
analysis.217  In addition, the clinical trials often were open 
label, (where doctor and patient were aware of which drug was 
being used) a study design generally viewed as inferior to 
random controlled trials especially where measures of 
improvement rely on patient self-reporting.  The OIG had 
specifically expressed concerns about these and similar 
structural practices in post-marketing clinical research in a 
 214. This activity actually may be protected. Washington Legal Foundation 
v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 74 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Greene, supra note 
173, at 50. 
 215. See Steinman et al., supra note 170, at 286; see also EPSTEIN supra 
note 7, at 154 ([For doctors,] “time is money, and any hour spent gathering 
information about new drugs is an hour away from some other part of their 
practice . . . . Many of these promotional efforts at wining and dining are 
understood in part as efforts to cover the opportunity cost of time.”). 
 216. The Justice Department singled out the promotion of Neurontin for 
“bipolar disease” and “monotherapy for epileptic seizure.”  Department of 
Justice, supra note 5. 
 217. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 54 (D. Mass. 2001). 
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1994 Fraud Alert.218  Finally, Parke-Davis originated the 
grants and protocols in their marketing department rather 
than in their research department, a practice that the 
government identified as “suspect activity” in OIG guidance 
issued after the initiation of the lawsuit but before the 
settlement.219 
In 2004, Parke-Davis entered into a settlement with the 
federal and state governments.  Parke-Davis paid $152 million 
plus interest to reimburse both the federal ($83.6 million) and 
the state ($68.4 million) governments for off-label prescriptions 
for Neurontin paid for by the state-federal Medicaid program.  
The company also settled state consumer protection claims for 
$38 million plus interest.  The company also accepted a 
mandatory corporate compliance program.  Finally, the firm 
pled guilty to the charge that some of its post-approval 
communications with physicians violated the restrictions of the 
FDCA and, therefore, violated the False Claims Act.  Parke-
Davis paid a criminal fine of $240 million for this violation.  
The qui tam relator recovered an additional $24.64 million 
from the firm as part of the settlement as well.220 
In all, Parke-Davis paid over $455 million to the 
government parties and to the relator, the largest settlement 
for such litigation to that date.221  The settlement also spawned 
several subsequent class action lawsuits against Parke-Davis 
by private insurers, including Aetna and the Teamsters, and by 
self-insured employers to recover what the insurance plans had 
 218. Special Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 65,376 (Aug. 1994). 
 219. OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 237,131 (May 5, 2003). 
 220. Department of Justice, supra note 5; see Matthew, supra note 164, at 
284 for discussion of qui tam relators in pharmaceutical cases. 
 221. An earlier federal criminal investigation of TAP Pharmaceutical 
Products, Inc., resulted in a guilty plea and payment of approximately 
$875,000,000 by TAP in 2001.  The issues in the TAP litigation did not involve 
off-label prescribing, but focused instead on TAP’s pricing practices for 
Medicare reimbursement as well as marketing practices. Press Release, 
Department of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others 
Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to 
Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/ 
October/513civ.htm.  Pricing was not involved in the Neurontin litigation.  For 
discussion of subsequent acquittal of TAP executives, see Matthew, supra note 
164, at 309–14. 
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paid for off-label prescriptions for Neurontin222 as well as 
products liability and consumer protection claims by patients 
themselves.223 
The DOJ and Parke-Davis disagreed over whether the 
firm’s activities fell within the ambit of the False Claims Act 
both as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.  The DOJ, 
however, produced significant evidence that the firm’s activities 
crossed over into suspect practices, including practices that the 
government had identified earlier as potential fraud; and 
Parke-Davis admitted to certain violations and paid a notably 
large settlement for a pharmaceutical case that did not involve 
pricing or kickback issues, perhaps in part because of the 
overwhelming risk of exclusion from the Medicare program if 
the DOJ succeeded in proving its case in court.224 
The “rest of the story” in this instance, however, does not 
lie in deciding whether the Department’s narrative or the 
defendant’s counter story about the company’s behavior is true, 
but rather in what was happening to Neurontin prescribing 
during the course of the litigation and thereafter.  In 2002, 94% 
of Neurontin prescriptions were for off-label indications, up 
from 40% in 1995.225  Neurontin sales amounted to $2.7 billion 
in 2003, of which nearly $2.5 billion was for off-label uses.226 
One might expect that Neurontin prescribing patterns 
would change as physicians learned of the government’s high-
profile attack on off-label prescribing of Neurontin and 
allegations of misleading marketing, but that is not the case.  
In August, 2004, two years into the state and federal 
governments’ pursuit of the lawsuit and shortly after the 
attention-grabbing settlement, sales of Neurontin had actually 
increased by 32% over the same quarter the year before.227  
 222. E.g., In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices and Products 
Liability Litigation, 433 F. Supp. 2d 172, 184 (D. Mass. 2006) (holding that 
plaintiff private insurers stated a claim against the manufacturer under the 
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). 
 223. See, e.g., Rubel v. Pfizer, 276 F. Supp. 2d 904 (N.D. Ill. 2003); 
Dellinger v. Pfizer, No. 5:03CV95, 2006 WL 2057654 (W.D.N.C. July 19, 2006); 
Jablow, supra note 167. 
 224. See supra note 169.  In addition, the settlement was actually approved 
by Pfizer, Inc., which had acquired Warner-Lambert/Parke-Davis during the 
course of this litigation, and Pfizer deflected fault by stating that the activities 
“did not involve Pfizer practices or employees.”  Kabler, supra note 170. 
 225. Schmit, supra note 189. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
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Lehman Brothers estimated that the great bulk of those 
prescriptions for Neurotin—90% of sales, in fact—were still for 
off-label uses.228  In fact, only in 2006 did another medication 
surpass sales of Neurontin for neuropathic pain—which was an 
off-label use for Neurontin during the course of the litigation 
until its approval by the FDA (only as to cases in which 
neuropathic pain is associated with shingles) in 2002—and this 
was due to the expiration of its patent protection and the 
resultant entry of generics.229 
The persistence of off-label prescribing for Neurontin even 
after the eye-popping settlement and guilty plea in this case, 
could be attributed to the observed persistence of prescribing 
habits in physicians described earlier.230  In other words, once 
brand loyalty has been purchased, it continues even after the 
flow of money and perquisites stops. 
In this case, however, some of the off-label prescribing of 
Neurontin actually was good medicine despite the fact that at 
the time no rigorous clinical studies supported the uses for 
which practicing doctors were prescribing the medication.  Off-
label prescribing decisions, even though stimulated by 
pharmaceutical detailing, may be justified and may provide 
essential care for patients.  Apparently, this was the case with 
the off-label use of Neurontin for relief of neuropathic pain. 
Neuropathic pain is one of the most treatment-resistant 
pain conditions that exist.  Such pain is chronic and 
debilitating and does not respond to more common pain 
medications, including opioids.231  It is not surprising that 
doctors trying to treat patients with neuropathic pain, and the 
patients themselves, would be willing to try innovative 
therapies to get some relief.  So it happened that doctors began 
to use Neurontin for neuropathic pain despite the fact that no 
rigorous clinical studies supported its use for that purpose.  
Patients experienced relief with Neurontin, and Parke-Davis 
apparently spread the word to its own benefit, but also to the 
benefit of patients in pain.  In 2002, the FDA formally approved 
 228. Id. 
 229. COMMERCIAL INSIGHT: NEUROPATHIC PAIN—A PLETHORA OF PATIENT 
SEGMENTATION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION OPPORTUNITIES 80 (2006). 
 230. See supra note 58. 
 231. See, e.g., Steve Simon et al., Breakthrough Pain in Opioid-Treated 
Patients with Neuropathic Pain, 2 J. OPIOID MGMT. 347, 347 (2006). 
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Neurontin for the treatment of post-herpetic neuropathic pain 
(i.e., nerve pain associated with shingles)232 in the midst of the 
Neurontin prosecution.  Neurontin has not been approved for 
the treatment of neuropathic pain caused by other disease 
states, and it will not be.  Nor is the drug likely to be subjected 
to double-blind, random-controlled clinical trials in persons 
suffering neuralgia from other conditions as the patent for the 
drug has expired, and generics are taking control of the 
market.233  The absence of clinical trials does not mean that 
Neurontin (now generic gabapentin) is not effective in treating 
these highly similar pain states just as FDA approval in 2002 
did not make the drug effective for treating pain.234  Nor was 
the experience of doctors and patients who observed the pain 
relieving effect of Neurontin “false” even though it would be 
categorized as “anecdotal.” 
The Neurontin litigation was not solely focused on the use 
of Neurontin for neuropathic pain, of course.  The DOJ 
specifically referenced the promotion of the drug for bipolar 
disorder, ALS, attention deficit disorder, migraine, withdrawal 
seizures, and restless leg syndrome in addition to “various pain 
states” in its statements describing the settlement.235  
Certainly, Neurontin may not be effective in treating all of 
these disorders; and surely it is distinctly possible that Parke-
Davis representatives exaggerated the evidence regarding 
these uses.  The now-proven effectiveness of Neurontin for 
neuropathic pain (but only that related to shingles) illustrates 
one of the challenges in establishing that inappropriate 
marketing causes inappropriate and ineffective prescribing.236 
Nearly one-third of the amount paid by Parke-Davis ($152 
million plus interest) was paid to the state and federal 
governments as reimbursement for payments made for off-label 
 232. Schmit, supra note 189; see also Neurontin, supra note 187. 
 233. See Hoover’s, supra note 26 (documenting a 77% decline in revenue 
from Neurontin after patent expiration); Department of Justice, supra note 5 
(observing that the defendant did not pursue approval of off-label uses because 
of the impending expiration of the patent on Neurontin). 
 234. Steven D. Passik & Kenneth L. Kirsh, Editorial, Weighing in on the 
Off-Label Use of Actiq™ for Noncancer-Related Pain: A Recipe for Success or a 
Recipe for Disaster?, 8 PAIN MED. 130, 130 (2007) (commenting on the fact that 
Actiq is approved only for cancer-related pain and not for pain caused by other 
diseases or conditions). 
 235. Department of Justice, supra note 5. 
 236. Schmit, supra note 189. 
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prescriptions of Neurontin for Medicaid beneficiaries.237  This 
payment signals that the government (as purchaser for the 
program’s beneficiaries) did not get what it paid for (i.e., 
effective treatment) when it paid for off-label prescriptions of 
this drug.238  Parke-Davis was accused, for example, of 
“steal[ing] from taxpayers” when it promoted off-label uses of 
Neurontin.239 After the settlement, however, Neurontin 
continued to be the third highest drug cost for some state 
Medicaid programs.240 
It would be reasonable for state Medicaid programs to turn 
the False Claims Act litigation, essentially a damning autopsy 
of the firm’s behavior, into prospective payment regulation.  
Even a year after the settlement produced “re-payments” to the 
Medicaid programs for prescriptions written prior to the date of 
settlement, however, state Medicaid programs continued to pay 
for off-label use of Neurontin without any significant change in 
payment standards.241  If Parke-Davis was required to repay 
the Medicaid program for the off-label prescribing it 
stimulated, because these prescriptions amounted to false 
claims, then why would the state continue to pay for those 
same prescriptions after the date of the settlement?  The State 
of Florida decided it would not do so.242 
In 2004, “following news reports that Neurontin was being 
widely prescribed for off-label uses and that reimbursement for 
the drug by state Medicaid programs was significant,” the 
Florida legislature acted to encourage the state Medicaid 
agency to constrain reimbursement for off-label prescriptions of 
Neurontin.243  The legislation specifically authorized the 
agency to implement a prior authorization program for “off-
label uses of Medicaid-covered prescribed drugs” that would 
require doctors “to provide information about the rational and 
 237. Id. 
 238. See id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. In fact, over the course of time, private pharmacy benefit managers 
also have largely abandoned efforts to restrict off-label prescribing.  Nor are 
private employer-based health insurance plans refusing to pay for off-label 
uses.  See discussion supra note 27; Matthew, supra note 164, at 326 
(discussing state laws mandating coverage of off-label prescriptions). 
 242. Edmonds v. Levine, 417 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 243. Id. 
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supporting medical evidence for the off-label use of the drug.”244 
In July, 2004, the Florida Medicaid agency established a 
policy under which it would pay for Neurontin only for its 
approved uses (adjunctive therapy for epileptic seizures245 and 
neuropathic pain associated with shingles) and for off-label 
uses only when safety and efficacy were proven “by double-
blind, placebo controlled, randomized clinical trials.”246  
However, the agency decided to reimburse for two unapproved 
indications for which there were no clinical studies proving the 
drug effective.247  These two uses were the prescription of 
Neurontin for ALS, for which the FDA had formally categorized 
Neurontin as an “orphan drug,”248 and for diabetic peripheral 
neuropathy.249  Thus, the agency refused to pay for 
prescriptions of Neurontin for any uses other than adjunctive 
therapy for epileptic seizures and partial refractory seizures; 
for post-herpetic neuropathic pain and diabetic peripheral 
neuropathy; and for ALS.250  It excluded, for example, 
prescriptions for Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic 
pain unless the patient had shingles or diabetes.  Patients with 
neuropathic pain from medical conditions other than shingles 
or diabetes filed suit.251 
Florida claimed that its coverage decisions for Neurontin 
complied with the federal Medicaid requirement that the state 
cover off-label uses that are “supported by one or more 
 244. Id. 
 245. Actually, it appears that the agency decided to cover Neurontin for the 
unapproved indication of “partial seizure refractory” within this category, 
perhaps mistakenly assuming that it was the same use as that approved by 
the FDA.  Id.  
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. An orphan drug has not been proven effective, but is categorized as 
such because it “might provide a significant benefit” to persons with “serious 
or life threatening illness” in which the number of people with the disease is 
relatively small (estimated at under 200,000).  One of the compendia approved 
for use in Medicaid actually reported that Neurontin was “ineffective” for use 
with ALS.  Id. at 1332. 
 249. Id.  The state also paid for Neurontin for a particular unapproved 
treatment for epilepsy.  Id. at 1331. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Plaintiff Mr. Edmonds, for example, suffered from neuropathy caused 
by medications required to treat HIV and had found that Neurontin relieved 
this pain after all other medications had failed.  Bob Lamendola, State Limits 
5 Medicaid Drugs to Save Money, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 2004, at B5. 
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citations”252 in the accepted drug compendia.253  The American 
Hospital Formulary Service Drug Informant (AHFS), an 
approved compendium, listed several off-label uses for 
Neurontin, including its use for neuropathic and neurogenic 
pain resulting from a variety of medical conditions, but did not 
provide any citations to studies or journal articles for any of 
these uses.254  Another of the approved compendia, DRUGDEX, 
listed fifty-four uses for Neurontin.  DRUGDEX classified each 
use as “effective, possibly effective, or ineffective” and rated the 
available documentation of effectiveness as “excellent, good, 
fair, and poor.”255  All but three of the fifty-four uses listed in 
this publication were recognized as either “effective” or 
“possibly effective.”256  Of the three uses categorized in 
DRUGDEX as “ineffective,” Florida’s Medicaid program 
actually covered two: ALS and a specific manifestation of 
epilepsy.257 
The District Court held that the Florida agency’s policy 
violated the coverage mandated in the federal Medicaid 
program.258  The court recognized that the state could have 
followed other routes within its authority under the federal 
Medicaid statute to control Medicaid payments for Neurontin 
prescriptions, which would have required case-by-case review 
 252. The federal statute does not define the word “citation.”  Edmonds, 417 
F. Supp. 2d at 1335. 
 253. There are some particular exceptions to this requirement, but the 
Florida policy did not fall within any of them.  For example, as described by 
the court in Edmonds, the state could establish a drug formulary that would 
exclude specific drugs and which would require a written justification of the 
exclusion by the agency.  Under the Medicaid statute, a state with an 
exclusionary formulary must have an authorization process in place where a 
doctor can submit a request to prescribe the drug, and the state will consider 
such requests on a case-by-case basis.  Alternatively, the state could require 
prior authorization for particular drugs.  In such a program, the request is 
always granted, but the doctor is required to seek prior authorization, which 
allows the state pharmacist to offer other alternatives.  Finally, a state can 
alert the Secretary of HHS to clinical abuse and overuse of a particular drug; 
and the Secretary can choose to list the drug as excluded from Medicaid 
coverage.  Id. 1327–30.  For the adverse impact of these methods of drug 
utilization controls, see Kleinke, supra note 28. 
 254. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1333. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id.; see supra notes 245 and 248. 
 258. Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. 
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for individual patients,259 but that the method used by the 
state violated the statutory mandat
In particular, the court noted that the state’s requirement 
that an off-label use would be covered only if it were supported 
by “double-blind, placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials” 
misinterpreted the statute as “the same standard employed for 
FDA-approved uses” and “the equivalent of saying the same 
thing twice.”261  The court said further: 
If Congress had intended that “medically accepted indications” must 
be supported by double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomized clinical 
trials, it would have said so . . . .  [Amendments of the statutory 
provision at issue] over the years substantiate the notion that 
Congress intended coverage for off-label uses, many of which would 
obviously not be supported by the same strict criteria required for 
FDA approval.262 
The core of the injury alleged and recovered for in the 
Neurontin litigation was that inappropriate marketing 
corrupted medical decision making with the result that the 
states paid for unnecessary or ineffective product.263  
Prescription of Neurontin for certain unapproved uses (for 
example, for neuropathic pain) did not injure the states in this 
fashion. In fact, Medicaid patients receiving the drug for those 
purposes received effective and necessary treatment even if the 
prescription was off-label, and even if their doctors learned of 
this use through firm-sponsored marketing.  Although the FDA 
has not approved Neurontin for the treatment of neuropathic 
pain generated by diseases or injuries other than shingles, it 
seems entirely reasonable for physicians to believe that the 
drug may be effective for those pain states as well, especially if 
patients are reporting positive results. 
It was also logical for the Florida Medicaid agency to 
address the forward flow of dollars after the Neurontin 
settlement.  Although the agency was thwarted in this effort by 
the federal Medicaid statute, its experience is more 
generalizable.  Requiring the completion of “double-blind, 
placebo-controlled randomized clinical trials” as a prerequisite 
for covering prescriptions for medications for unapproved uses 
appeals to the notion of medicine as science, but would have 
 259. See supra note 253. 
 260. See Edmonds, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1343. 
 261. Id. at 1337. 
 262. Id. 
 263. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
JOHNSON S. POLLUTING MEDICAL JUDGMENT? FALSE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF FALSE 
CLAIMS REGARDING OFF-LABEL PRESCRIBING. MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2007;9(1):61-124.  
122 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:1 
 
                                                          
 
prevented patients in some cases from receiving the only 
effective care available.264 
Private insurers have fared no better than the State of 
Florida in their attempts to control individual off-label 
prescribing decisions, 265 and their challenges have nothing to 
do with the Medicaid statute.266  The hesitancy of private 
payers to involve themselves in reining in off-label prescribing 
may be a simple matter of administrative convenience.267  If 
their primary concern is to control drug costs, there are less 
expensive methods for doing so.268  These include shifting costs 
to consumers through co-pays, tiered benefit systems, prior 
authorization requirements, and step therapy (“fail first”) 
mechanisms.269  These are hardly satisfactory as methods for 
evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of an off-label 
prescription—or any prescription for that matter—because they 
erect barriers unrelated to the effectiveness of medications. 
There are emerging efforts to constrain prescribing, 
especially off-label prescribing, within a rubric of effectiveness 
and quality rather than cost control.  These efforts face several 
significant obstacles discussed in this paper.270  First, these 
efforts must address directly the inadequate quantity and 
quality of post-approval research on approved drugs and the 
resulting deficiencies in clinical guidelines.  Public funding for 
such trials is simply inadequate; private funding by 
pharmaceutical firms has been made suspect; incentives for 
private funding by private insurers are limited when they can 
achieve their cost-containment goals through much less 
expensive means; and incentives for the insurers to share the 
knowledge they produce on other than a proprietary basis are 
uncertain.  Moreover, if private insurers and pharmacy benefit 
 264. Of course, the methods for controlling prescribing that are permitted 
in the federal Medicaid scheme may also harm patients. See Kleinke, supra 
note 28, at 44. 
 265. See discussion of private efforts supra note 28.  The Medicare Part D 
program has established standards similar to those of the Medicaid program.  
42 C.F.R. 423.100; 70 Fed. Reg. 4194-01 (Jan. 28, 2005).  
 266. Kleinke, supra note 28, at 41. 
 267. See id., at 42. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See generally Neumann, Emerging Lessons from the Drug 
Effectiveness Review Project, supra note 28; Neumann, Evidence-Based and 
Value-Based Formulary Guidelines, supra note 81. 
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managers begin to provide serious funding for clinical trials, 
who is to say that this funding also will not be viewed as 
suspect for the same reasons of self-serving interests that are 
now recited for pharmaceutical funding?  Second, even if a 
robust program of Phase IV clinical trials of expanded uses for 
approved drugs does emerge, there will still be the irreducible 
clinical uncertainties—uncertainties caused by unavoidable 
temporal gaps between the immediacy of clinical decision 
making and the slow clock required for trials to be conceived, 
designed, and executed as well as uncertainties caused by the 
performance of the drug on individual patients. 
CONCLUSION 
We can view the Neurontin litigation as catching a bad 
actor.  Certainly, the evidence of Parke-Davis’s marketing, 
educational and research practices provides sufficient support 
for that view.  With that perspective, the litigation simply 
dramatizes the conflicts-of-interest narrative of pharmaceutical 
firm-prescriber co-dependencies. 
The litigation, the persistence of off-label prescribing post-
litigation, and the difficulties encountered in translating the 
recovery of Medicaid payments into prospective controls raise 
broader issues than those that will fit under the conflicts-of-
interest umbrella, however.  Conflicts-of-interest regulation, 
both public and private, works only at the margins of the issues 
raised in this situation.  While conflicts-of-interest surveillance 
and management may produce some benefits, this approach 
can also give a false sense of problem solved even though those 
interventions do not reach the core issues of the production and 
dissemination of clinical knowledge.  Conflicts-of-interest 
restrictions may remove one source generating increased 
distrust of the research enterprise, even though this distrust 
may be misplaced.  Conflicts-of-interest restrictions will not 
fund post-marketing research, and may actually reduce current 
resources if the risks of industry funding of post-approval trials 
include criminal and civil prosecution; will not improve 
physician learning, and appears to be reducing educational 
opportunities as firms react to increased risks; and will not fill 
the knowledge voids within which both doctors and regulators 
currently practice. 
Even if the financial relationships between prescribing 
doctors and Parke-Davis were inappropriate and perhaps 
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illegal, the existence of those relationships did not prove that 
the off-label prescriptions were themselves inappropriate.  Off-
label prescribing, even where clinical trials proving efficacy for 
new indications have not yet begun or are not yet completed, 
can bring great benefit to patients.  Of course, such prescribing 
can also subject patients to ineffective medications with the 
attendant costs and risks.  The real challenge is not detecting 
and prosecuting the zealous marketing efforts of a Parke-Davis, 
but rather it is assuring that patients get good care.  Raising 
the risks for pharmaceutical firms in funding Phase IV clinical 
trials and continuing medical education will not get us there.  
Nor will targeting off-label prescribing as if there were no risks 
in doing so. 
 
 
